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LENIN ON SOVIET ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 24 Mar 82) pp 3-9

[Article, published under the heading "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col (Res) M. Molodtsygin and Maj P. Nersesyan: "Lenin on the Features of Organizational Development of the Army of the Multinational Soviet State"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Soviet citizens are celebrating the anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth in an atmosphere of preparations for the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. The Soviet state's jubilee is one of the banner events which, as CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the November 1981 party CC Plenum, "is called upon to provide a new, powerful impetus to a further reinforcement of the unity of the party and nation, to an even closer solidarity of all nations and nationalities in the country, and to an upsurge in the political and creative activeness of the masses."¹ During these days we turn again and again to the very rich heritage of Lenin and try to understand its importance in the history of the multinational Soviet state and of our Armed Forces.

To Lenin goes credit for a further development of the Marxist theory of the nation, development of the Communist Party program on the question of nationalities, and elaboration of the most important directions of the party's policy of nationalities in all areas of the Soviet state organizational development, including military. The creation of the USSR is /"a living embodiment of the ideas of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin,"/ states the CPSU CC Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation," and it emphasizes in particular that "Lenin thoroughly grounded the need for the closest union of Soviet republics to accomplish the tasks of building socialism and protecting the Motherland against the encroachments of imperialism."² The USSR's formation in turn was one of the important factors of the consolidation of forces of Soviet nations in the struggle for peace and for reinforcing the country's military might. Lenin's elaboration of the theoretical principles of building an army of the multinational Soviet state and his personal participation in organizing this process were of great importance in the establishment and strengthening of the USSR Armed Forces.

/The most important feature of the creation of an army of our multinational state was that resolution of the question of nationalities in this instance, as in all areas of Soviet organizational development, was subordinated to the tasks of implementing a dictatorship of the proletariat and strengthening and developing it./ "Our Army is a class Army against the bourgeoisie,"³ wrote V. I. Lenin. The class principle envisaged on the one hand the formation of the Red Army from the proletariat and semiproletariat layers of the peasantry close to it and, on the other hand, absolute support for the tasks of defending achievements of the socialist revolution and the interests of the world proletariat. This was reflected in the RSFSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] Decree dated 15 January 1918, according to which the Red Army might be joined by every toiler ready to defend the achievements of October, power of the Soviets, and socialism. The addition of "and socialism" included in the draft by Lenin stressed extremely precisely the international character of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] class mission: The workers and peasants of different nations must defend the interests of socialism as a social system created by brothers in class, regardless of national allegiance. Lenin's letter to CIC I. I. Vatsetis dated 29 November 1918 is characteristic in this regard. It was at the very time that the Red Army was advancing successfully westward that Vladimir Il'ich wrote: "We request that [you] give command personnel of appropriate military units instructions that our troops are to support in every way the provisional Soviet governments of Latvia, Estlyandiya, the Ukraine and Lithuania, but of course, only Soviet governments."⁴

In order for the multinational Red Army to fulfill its class duty worthily, the Communist Party headed by V. I. Lenin showed constant concern for strengthening its working nucleus, about which fighting men from the peasantry rallied. The more representatives of different nationalities there were in the military formations, the higher was the proletarian layer there. In August 1920 the workers' layer among troops stationed in the national regions (especially in outlying areas) comprised, in comparison with the average figure for military districts (13.0 percent): 15.1 percent in Kirghiziya, 20.9 percent in the Ukraine, 19.7 percent in Turkestan, and 14.9 percent in the Caucasus (including some areas with primarily a Russian population).⁵ This can be traced even more clearly in examining the national and social make-up of smaller troop formations. In October 1920 there were over 50 percent of the soldiers of non-Russian nationalities in 40 units united under the Syrdar'ya political department, including 43.5 percent from local eastern nations. The workers' layer here was 42.7 percent.⁶

Another no less important feature in the creation of an army of a multinational state was the /constant party leadership in Soviet military organizational development./ The influence of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] was determined largely by the number of party members among the troops. They numbered some 300,000 persons by the end of the Civil War. And just as with the proletarian layer, the party layer was higher in formations where more soldiers of non-Russian nationalities served. Based on data of the Narkomvoyen [People's Commissariat for Military Affairs] account for 1921, party members in the Army as a whole made up 6.9 percent, while there were 11.1 percent in the North Caucasus Military District, 13.9 in the Kiev

Military District, and 14.6 percent in the Separate Caucasus Army.⁷ Special concern was shown to ensure that their ranks were filled by soldiers of different nationalities. In late 1920 in the 4th Turkestan Rifle Brigade, consisting mainly of Tatars, 545 of the 859 party members and candidate members were Tatars (63.4 percent), 21 were Kirghiz, 10 were Uzbek and 7 were Turkmen.⁸

Lenin taught that Communist Party leadership and authority ensured the unity of the Soviet people and consequently the solidarity of workers of all nations in the struggle against the interventionists and White Guards. In the fierce struggle against Trotskyites, nationalists, social deviants and other enemies of the Leninist party, the party developed fundamental lines on all questions of Soviet military organizational development and in the organization of training and indoctrination of Red Army men. The implementation of party directives involved the overcoming of a number of difficulties where it was a question of service in the RKKA by workers of previously oppressed nationalities which had been kept in obscurity and ignorance by the aristocratic autocracy. They had to be taught to read and write, given a feeling of their own worth, and given an explanation of the essence of Soviet power and the mission of the Red Army. In order for "the Red Army to be really socialist," stated the RKP(b) CC circular letter dated 28 July 1919, "it not only has to be class in composition, but its composition also has to realize its class interests clearly and correctly. And party work in its midst is necessary for this."⁹ This party work, as well as the entire matter of communist propaganda among representatives of different nationalities, has to be carried on, stated Lenin, "in a language understandable by the people..."¹⁰

In carrying out instructions of the party CC and Lenin, local party entities gave the Red Army great assistance in political indoctrination of fighting men, especially of non-Russian nationalities. But the chief part of the work of political indoctrination of fighting men of non-Russian nationalities naturally rested with the commissars, Army party members, and RKKA political entities. 1918 marked the beginning of the creation of nationality sections (subdepartments, sections, boards--they bore different names) under political departments of troop formations and then of combined units. As the Red Army advanced into areas populated by different nations and as soldiers of non-Russian nationality arrived, the network of such political entity sections expanded considerably. Their tasks included political indoctrination of Red Army men of non-Russian nationalities, inclusion of the best of them in RKP(b) ranks and creation of party cells, concern for stamping out illiteracy and for cultural leisure, the publication of newspapers, leaflets and pamphlets in different languages, participation in the selection of foremost fighting men for military educational institutions as well as participation in military mobilization measures, and political work with the populace of the zone near the front.

/The inclusion of workers of all nationalities in service in the RKKA under equal conditions was one of the features of the Red Army which distinguished it fundamentally from armies of exploiting states./ In a speech given on 26 July 1918 Lenin stressed especially that "the Soviet republic brings together workers of all nations and defends the interests of workers without distinction of nations."¹¹

The Sovnarkom Decree dated 15 January 1918 on organizing the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, carefully edited and signed by V. I. Lenin, did not provide for any national restrictions for entry into the RKKA. With the conversion to universal military obligation the possibilities for including workers of different nations for service in the RKKA expanded. An order for Semirechinskaya Oblast (Kazakhstan) disbanding local partisan detachments and shifting to the organization of regular Red Army units was announced as early as 2 July 1918.¹² A mobilization of Kalmyks announced for the first time in December 1918 went successfully.¹³ But Lenin cautioned party members against a stereotyped implementation of decrees in all areas of Russia and demanded a consideration of national features of peoples and that they be cautious, patient, and yielding toward vestiges of national distrust.¹⁴ Following Lenin's instructions, party organizations and military entities observed a maximum of tact in introducing universal military obligation for previously oppressed nations.

A session of the Labor and Defense Council chaired by Lenin on 30 April 1920 discussed the issue of calling up citizens of non-Russian nationality into Red Army ranks. After additional special agreements with the Narkomat for affairs of nationalities, the draft STO [Labor and Defense Council] Decree was briefed to Lenin and signed by him on 10 May 1920. It stated that citizens of non-Russian nationalities of Siberia, Turkestan and other outlying areas are subject to being called into the Army on an equal basis with other RSFSR citizens. The Communist Party's firm line was seen here on including previously oppressed nationalities in defense of the socialist homeland. Meanwhile local entities of authority had the right (with subsequent approval by the Labor and Defense Council) to relieve "a particular nationality or group of citizens of non-Russian nationality"¹⁵ of military obligation in case of special conditions, which met Lenin's demand to give maximum consideration to national features and to be respectful toward conditions of life and formation of all nations.

As a result of the wise, dialectical resolution by Lenin, the Communist Party and the Soviet state of the very difficult question of nationalities, the Red Army became truly multinational by the end of the Civil War. In 1921 Armenians, Bashkirs, Belorussians, Georgians, Jews, Kazakhs, Kalmyks, Kirghiz, Komi, Letts, Lithuanians, Mari, Mordvinians, Germans, Poles, Tajiks, Tatars, Turkmens, Udmurts, Chuvash, Estonians and others were serving in the RKKA along with Russians (who consisted of some 82 percent) and Ukrainians (some 9 percent).¹⁶

The Red Army's multinational composition posed a large number of problems for the Communist Party and military entities, from the order of manning units and subunits to the organization of messing for fighting men of non-Russian peoples. What were purely military or housekeeping problems at first glance also became political problems inasmuch as it was a question of the most optimum consideration of the national features of those mobilized and observance of interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet state as a whole. After the RSFSR Sovnarkom decree on formation of the RKKA came out, the Narkomat board noted in the resolution "National Commissariats and the Red Army" that an opportunity had appeared for creating national Red

Army units, and on 7 May 1918 it adopted a decree on the possibility of creating national military units on territory where individual nations are living (the Ukraine, Bashkiria, Armenia and so on). The formation of national detachments of refugees and emigres was allowed as an exception.

It is of no small importance to note that one other feature which distinguished the Red Army from armies of exploiting states was that /as a rule, national units and subunits formed in different parts of the country were not of a single nationality, but included representatives of all peoples/ living in the given area.

Lenin constantly monitored the correctness with which the Communist Party's policy of nationalities was implemented in military organizational development, and particularly the formation of national units. We are familiar with his numerous letters and messages on this question.¹⁷ For example, in the spring and summer of 1919 Vladimir Il'ich paid great attention to the Bashkir troops, announcing the formation of a Bashkir division in Belebey at a session of the Defense Council. On 5 September he sent a message to Ufa in which he explained the political significance of a transfer of several Bashkir units for the defense of Petrograd: "The predatory imperialists will see that the aroused peoples of the East have risen up to defend the centers of proletarian revolution. At the same time close contact of armed Bashkirs with Petrograd workers will ensure a close tie and mutual respect in a spirit of communism."¹⁸ On 12 and 14 September an STO session chaired by Lenin heard reports about the movement of Bashkir troops. At a grandiose rally in Petrograd on 28 September Bashkir Red Army men swore not to let their weapons from their hands until the total defeat of the White Guards. Soon the chief of the 7th Army political department noted at a party conference that Bashkir soldiers were standing steadfastly in defense of Petrograd and the number of party members among them was growing. From November 1919 through January 1920 the number of Bashkir party members in the 1st Rifle Regiment increased from 14 to 99 persons, and from 12 to 40 persons in the 2d Rifle Regiment.¹⁹

/The indoctrination of command cadres from representatives of different nationalities was a distinguishing feature in the creation of the multinational Red Army./ While command positions in armies of exploiting states usually were held by persons from the ruling classes of the dominant nation, under conditions of Soviet power there was a steadfast implementation of Lenin's demand to train Red commanders from among the people. As early as 1919 there were special courses for preparing Red commanders for infantry and cavalry units from among Moslem workers. According to incomplete data of the organizational directorate of the RKKA staff, there were 1,287 representatives only of eastern nationalities, as they were then called, in command and administrative management positions (not counting political workers and physicians) as of 1 February 1920, and of them over 100 persons were of different nationalities of the North Caucasus: Avars, Kabardinians, Kumyks, Lezghins, Ossetians, Chechens and others.²⁰

Finally, we also should emphasize a feature of military organizational development in the multinational Soviet state such as attainment of /military uniformity of the republics./ It resulted from granting a number of nations

full independence and their own statehood. Lenin devoted enormous attention to this matter.²¹

We know that in late 1918 and early 1919 large national formations were set up in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia and Estonia. Lenin signed instructions for preparation of a CC directive on military unity on 24 April after becoming familiar with the detailed report of the CIC about results of military organizational development in Estonia, Latvia, Belorussia and the Ukraine. On 4 May 1919 the military question was discussed at an RKP(b) CC plenum held under Lenin's direction. Plenum decisions were the basis of a decree adopted on 1 June 1919 at a session of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] with the participation of representatives of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian and Lettish nations. The decree envisaged unification above all of the "military organization and military command," as well as of national economic councils, rail transportation administrations, finance administrations and labor commissariats. Securing the military and economic alliance of nations legislatively, it attested to the victory of Lenin's policy of nationalities. The experience in unifying military efforts of the Soviet republics was used subsequently in the liberation of peoples of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

On 26 December 1921 the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian republics together with the Belorussian and Ukrainian republics appeared at the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets with a declaration which said in part that under the conditions at hand the most effective "means of ensuring the independence of Soviet territory and the possibility of reconstructing its economy and preventing new attacks from without and attempts at reviving the Civil War from within is to strengthen the Red Army's might comprehensively."²² This declaration reemphasized the desire of all fraternal nations for military unity needed for protection against a common foe.

The indestructible friendship of our country's nations became one of the deciding conditions of victory over the unified forces of world imperialism, which reinforced the international and domestic position of the Land of Soviets, and the military and economic alliance of fraternal republics which formed in these years was an important precondition for their unification within the scope of one state. In the Declaration on Formation of the USSR adopted on 30 December 1922 by the 1st All-Union Congress of Soviets it is stated directly that the danger of new attacks makes "inevitable the creation of a single front of Soviet republics in the face of capitalist encirclement."²³ The experience of Soviet military organizational development in national rayons of the RSFSR served as a good foundation for elaboration of corresponding problems on the scale of the USSR. It was not by chance that in materials for the 2d Congress of the Communist International Lenin pointed out "military affairs" as one of the components of "maintaining/ the federation" and he viewed a federative association as a form of transition "to full unity."²⁴

Thus Lenin's statements and his practical activities played an enormous role in creating an army of a multinational socialist state. It was built under a proletarian-class principle requiring the subordination of national demands

to the interests of class struggle, and under the continuous leadership influence of the Communist Party. Representatives of all nations entered it with equal rights and had an opportunity to serve in national formations. But in contrast to prerevolutionary formations they were international both in missions and, as a rule, in composition, which contributed to the development of friendship and fraternity of the nations of our country. The optimum form of a military and economic alliance was found for the Soviet republics, which was pointed out repeatedly in party Central Committee documents at that time and in our days.

The USSR's formation ensured a further increase in national economic and military might. New national formations were created and the proportion of soldiers of non-Russian nationality increased during implementation of the five-year program of military organizational development adopted by the USSR Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] in late 1924. While this proportion was 21.3 percent of the personnel in 1922, it was 38.8 percent in 1925. By the latter half of the 1930's national formations basically had fulfilled their role. In March 1938, under conditions of an ever growing threat of aggression against the USSR and continuous improvement in combat equipment and weapons, the Communist Party and Soviet government adopted a resolution providing for the conversion of national units and combined units to exterritorial manning.

The correctness of Lenin's policy of nationalities in military organizational development was confirmed clearly in the years of stern ordeals of the Great Patriotic War. Soldiers of different nationalities fought courageously shoulder to shoulder at the front and in the enemy rear. "If we speak of the main hero of the Great Patriotic War," remarked L. I. Brezhnev, "then this immortal hero is the entire friendly family of nations populating our country and welded together by indestructible bonds of brotherhood."²⁵ One of the conditions for constant reinforcement of the Soviet Armed Forces in the post-war period as well is their international essence.

A study of Lenin's theoretical heritage in questions of the national policy in Soviet military organizational development as well as of the historical experience of creating an army of our multinational state is of great importance for fraternal communist and working parties. At the same time it helps Soviet officers better perform the tasks of patriotic and international indoctrination of soldiers. This is especially important under conditions of preparation for the USSR's 60th anniversary, since creation of the Red Army as an army of friendship and brotherhood of nations and implementation of military unity of Soviet republics during the Civil War and the fight against interventionists were important conditions for formation of the USSR later.

FOOTNOTES

1. KOMMUNIST, No 17, 1981, p 12.
2. PRAVDA, 21 February 1982.

3. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XLIII, 230.
4. Ibid., XXXVII, 234.
5. "Trudy Tsentral'nogo statisticheskogo upravleniya" [Works of the Central Statistical Administration], Vol XIII, 1st issue, Military Statistical Department. "Results of Red Army and Navy Census of 28 August 1920," p 26, Table X-Ye, Moscow, 1920, izd. TsSU [Central Statistical Administration].
6. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], stack 110, list 2, file 558, sheets 50, 55, 60, 66. Computed by the authors.
7. Ibid., stack 4, list 5, file 89, sheet 7.
8. Ibid., stack 9, list 21, file 3, sheets 24-24 reverse. Computed by authors.
9. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty. 1917--1981" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents 1917-1981], Voenizdat, 1981, p 114.
10. Lenin, XXXIX, 330.
11. Ibid., XXXVI, 536.
12. "Obrazovaniye Kazakhskoy ASSR. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov" [Formation of the Kazakh ASSR: Collection of Documents and Materials], Alma-Ata, Izd-vo Kazakhskoy SSR, 1957, p 324.
13. "Yedinstvo sovetskogo fronta i tyla v gody grazhdanskoy voyny 1918--1920 gg. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov" [Unity of the Soviet Front and Rear in the Civil War of 1918-1920: Collection of Documents and Materials], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1943, p 47.
14. See Lenin, XXXVIII, 144; XL, 43.
15. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Decrees of Soviet Power], Vol VIII, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 176.
16. TsGASA, stack 4, list 5, file 98, sheet 6 reverse.
17. See Lenin, "Voyennaya perepiska 1917--1922 gg." [Military Census of 1917-1922], Voenizdat, 1966, pp 127, 154, 166, 172, 176, 178, 181, 183, 188, 220, 240-241.
18. Lenin, LI, 44.
19. TsGASA, stack 130, list 2, file 89A, sheet 90; file 464, sheet 14.

20. Ibid., stack 7, list 6, file 32, sheets 1-83. Computed by authors.
21. See a detailed analysis both of positive and negative aspects of the formation of national armies and the struggle of Lenin and the Communist Party for creating military unity of the Soviet republics in the book by Kulichenko, M. I., "Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoy partii za resheniye natsional'nogo voprosa v 1918--1920 gg." [The Communist Party's Struggle for Resolution of the Question of Nationalities in 1918-1920], Khar'kov, Izd-vo Khar'kovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1963, pp 87, 113; Klyatskin, S. M., "Na zashchite Oktyabrya" [In Defense of October], Moscow, Nauka, 1965, pp 379-390; Yu. I. Korablev, "V. I. Lenin i zashchita zavoyevaniy Velikogo Oktyabrya" [V. I. Lenin and Defense of the Achievements of the Great October], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, pp 491-505; "KPSS -- organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [The CPSU is the Organizer of the Defense of the Socialist Homeland], 2d ed., Voenizdat, 1977, pp 11-112; "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily. Istoriya stroitel'stva" [The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Organizational Development], Voenizdat, 1978, pp 84-85, and others.
22. "Obrazovaniye SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov 1917--1924" [Formation of the USSR: Collection of Documents 1917-1924], Moscow-Leningrad, Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1949, p 258.
23. Ibid., p 333.
24. Lenin, XLI, 438.
25. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [With a Leninist Course: Speeches and Articles], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 137.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: COMBAT TRAINING OF AIR DEFENSE TROOPS

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[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War," by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col (Ret) N. Svetlishin: "From the Experience of the Combat Training of National Air Defense Troops During the Great Patriotic War"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] One of the chief requirements placed on the National Air Defense Forces during the Great Patriotic War was to be in constant combat readiness to repulse an air attack. This depended largely on the degree of schooling the troops attained in the process of combat training. This article sets the goal of illuminating certain aspects of the National Air Defense Forces combat training experience during the war. Primary attention is given to revealing features of combat training as well as the role of the command element and staffs in organizing it.

/The requirement for improving the organization of combat training in the National Air Defense Forces during the Great Patriotic War was determined by a number of objective reasons,/ among which the following were of decisive importance: a continuous build-up in the National Air Defense Forces fighting strength because of new formations; assignment of a certain portion of air defense forces and weapons as replacements for Ground Forces fronts; continuous changes in the nature and tactics of fascist German air operations in delivering strikes against defended installations; and the delivery of more sophisticated models of weapons and combat equipment to the National Air Defense Forces.

Throughout the war the range of missions performed by the National Air Defense Forces expanded continuously, which required a constant increase in their fighting strength through the deployment of new air defense units and combined units. By May 1945 the National Air Defense Forces had 3.5 times more personnel than at the beginning of the war. The number of fighter aircraft rose 2.7 times, medium caliber antiaircraft guns threefold, small caliber AA guns 26 times, AA machineguns 13 times, AA searchlights 3.5 times, and barrage balloons 1.7 times.

The large scale deployment of National Air Defense Forces during the Great Patriotic War, especially in its initial period, is indicated, for example, by the fact that mobilization deployment just of units of the 1 Air Defense Corps defending Moscow resulted in a 7.5 times increase in its personnel, with almost a twofold increase in the number of AA batteries, searchlight stations, posts and other subunits.¹

Personnel arrived as replacements in the newly activated units and combined units, many of whom had not been trained for service in air defense. Therefore it was necessary not only to allocate replacements correctly and expediently to subunits, but also arrange planned, purposeful combat training. This was conducted with great intensity throughout the war.

In addition to defending the most important industrial and economic centers and other strategic installations, National Air Defense Forces also accomplished the responsible mission of preparing certain reserve formations for Ground Forces fronts. Based on directives of the V GK [Supreme High Command] Headquarters, combined units, units and subunits (AAA, AA machinegun, fighter aviation and others) were formed on their base under the direction of the air defense command element and political entities. In the first six months of war alone the Moscow air defense command element activated and trained for the Ground Forces 22 air defense units (some 4,000 officers and over 10,000 NCO's and privates).²

In the summer and fall of 1942 a number of combined units and units, including two fighter aviation divisions (the 72d and 259th), were activated and trained on the base of the Baku Air Defense Army, and then sent to various sectors of the Soviet-German Front.³

The problem of organizing and conducting systematic combat training in air defense units arose especially keenly in the spring of 1942, when tens of thousands of women came into the National Air Defense Forces to replace male soldiers who had left for the front. They had to be trained in limited time periods in the specialties of antiaircraft gunners, aviation specialists, searchlight operators and barrage balloon operators, and this had to be done under conditions of unceasing raids on defended installations by fascist German aviation.

It also should be borne in mind that the general nature and operating tactics of enemy aviation changed during the war, which demanded an improvement in the air defense system, in the preparation and methods of combat operations by air defense combined units and units, and consequently of the training of air defense personnel.

During the war the National Air Defense Forces were outfitted with more up-to-date models of weapons and equipment. For example, air defense fighter aviation was fully reoutfitted with new fighter aircraft and the VNOS [air surveillance, warning and communications] troops received a considerable number of radars. The reoutfitting of air defense units with new equipment also entailed retraining of personnel.

The facts cited above convincingly indicate that one of the pressing problems for the National Air Defense Forces throughout the Great Patriotic War was the organization and conduct of systematic, goal-oriented combat training of air defense units and combined units with consideration of lessons learned from combat operations.

/A characteristic feature of the National Air Defense Forces combat training in the war years/ was the fact that its content and direction were determined above all by the need for ensuring high combat readiness of air defense units for performing their missions, especially connected with changes in the overall operational situation or the nature of fascist German aviation operations. National Air Defense Forces units were widely used in the first period of war, especially in the summer-fall campaign of 1941, to combat the ground enemy. In connection with this, the air defense command element and staffs had to arrange classes in order to train antiaircraft gunners, searchlight operators and VNOs personnel to combat infantry and tanks, fire on tanks with artillery pieces, and throw grenades and Molotov cocktails. Intensive training of high-altitude pilots unfolded among troops of the Moscow Air Defense Front in the summer of 1942, while personnel training in firing with a special time fuze was arranged in AAA units. This was caused by the fact that the enemy had begun to use Junkers-88 aircraft adapted for high-altitude flights for reconnaissance of the Moscow area.

/Another feature of National Air Defense Forces combat training during the Great Patriotic War/ was the fact that it was organized and conducted under conditions of vigorous operations by fascist German aircraft and where the enemy had an opportunity to deliver an air strike at any moment against installations defended by air defense units, especially those in the zone near the front and in the operational rear. This circumstance demanded that all measures of troop combat training be accomplished with consideration of the assurance of constant, high readiness to repulse an enemy air attack and perform the assigned mission in any situation. Therefore it usually was the personnel of those subunits which were not performing operational readiness or which were in a lower degree of readiness who engaged in combat training. For example, one battery in every AAA battalion in air defense AAA units was in Readiness No 1, combat training classes were being held in another battery, and a third battery rested. During the classes personnel made a detailed study of equipment design and drilled long and hard at the guns and instruments. Commanders struggled for supreme teamwork of crews, platoons and batteries. General regimental practices were conducted 2-3 times a day without counting alerts when the air enemy appeared.⁴

While fighting a vigorous battle against enemy aircraft, air defense fighter aviation units simultaneously were perfecting combat training and practicing fire missions and the tactics of aerial combat. Efforts here were focused on training masters of aerial combat capable of conducting combat actions under difficult meteorological conditions. Groups for training aces were formed for this purpose in aviation combined units. Classes were conducted under a special plan where they practiced aerial combat in aircraft of different types, studied the theory of aerial gunnery, perfected flying techniques and so on.

Serious difficulties in planning, organizing and conducting National Air Defense Forces combat training during the war years resulted from the fact that subunits of AAA personnel, machinegunner-searchlight personnel, barrage balloon operators and VNOS posts were located in small groups, scattered at positions, and a considerable distance from each other, even though they were performing a single combat mission.

/A feature of National Air Defense Forces combat training during the past war/ also was, that it had to be conducted in extremely compressed time periods, under conditions of a limited training facility and limited resources allocated for these purposes. These circumstances determined the exceptional intensity of work by commanders and staffs to organize and support the planned troop combat training.

Combat training in the war years was conducted under unified combat training plans of combined units and units. In a number of instances, however, special combat training plans were drawn up at the level of air defense formations for studying and working out new matters involving actual or possible changes in the nature of the air enemy's operations. For example, during the summer-fall campaign of 1944 the combat training of units and combined units of all air defense arms in fighting cruise missiles was organized among troops of the Special Moscow and Leningrad air defense armies under specially drawn up plans.⁵

/The combat training system in the war years encompassed all measures for the training and military indoctrination of National Air Defense Forces personnel/ for successful conduct of combat actions to destroy the air enemy under all conditions. It included individual training of air defense personnel and the training of subunits, units, combined units, commanders and staffs of air defense. Classes, exercises, field firings, practices and other activities were conducted during which servicemen studied military regulations, manuals, weapons, military equipment, and methods of their employment and actions in repulsing raids by fascist German aviation.

/At the same time the combat training system of every air defense arm (or service) had its features./ For example, VNOS units would assimilate methods of timely detection of the air enemy on distant approaches to the defended installations and the vectoring of our fighter aircraft to enemy aircraft, especially using radar, the numbers of which continuously rose among the troops, during combat training and while performing continuous operational readiness. AAA units would accomplish fire missions in all methods of fire and throughout the full range of AA guns' fire, and they mastered the tactics of maneuver operations and techniques of coordination with friendly fighters in repulsing enemy air raids on defended installations. Fighter aviation would practice methods of intercepting and destroying air targets under various weather conditions day and night. Special attention was given to training personnel to perform combat missions in coordination with AAA and searchlight units, where combat training was being conducted with consideration of their being refitted with radar-directed searchlights.

/Throughout the Great Patriotic War the issues of troop combat training were a constant focus of attention for the command element, staffs and political entities/ of formations, combined units and units as well as of party and Komsomol organizations. Experience indicates that the primary function of commanders and staffs of air defense formations (fronts, armies) in organizing troop combat training consisted of a determination of objectives and missions of unit and combined unit combat training based on the operational purpose of the air defense formation and features of the overall concept of troop combat actions.

The main ideas which commanders of air defense formations usually included in plans for organizing troop combat training consisted of the following: achieving a steady increase in troop combat readiness to repulse enemy air strikes and raids; assuring the defeat of fascist German aircraft at a maximum distance from the defended installations; achieving full and effective implementation of troop combat capabilities; an integrated approach to different kinds of combat and tactical training; and ensuring precise coordination of air defense arms in repulsing air attacks.

Combat and political training missions would be made known to the troops in orders of the commanders of air defense formations. Such orders would be issued separately for the winter and summer-fall periods.

The Directorate of Air Defense Troops Combat Training was of great assistance to the air defense command element and staffs in organizing troop training during the Great Patriotic War. It would publish methods collections (at least twice a year) which set forth concrete recommendations on questions of organizing, planning, supporting and conducting troop combat training classes with consideration of war experience, beginning with the methodology of individual training for personnel of specific air defense specialties (air defense gunners, VNOs personnel, searchlight operators and so on) and classes in subunit teamwork training and in practicing coordination among different air defense arms, and ending with the methodology of holding practices with command post teams.

It should be emphasized that in planning combat training the commanders and staffs of air defense combined units and units tried to avoid stereotypes, reduce the volume of planning documents through their quality, give comprehensive consideration to the combat training level the personnel had reached and the requirements of war experience, seek new forms of combat employment of weapons, and ensure reality of plans under concrete conditions of the existing combat situation of a given combined unit or unit.

/The process of planning/ combat training in air defense combined units included resolution of the following main issues: determination of the chief mission of combat training for a specific period, stemming from the combat mission of the air defense combined unit (or unit) and conditions of the operational situation, which was to be given primary attention in troop training, and a determination of the results they were to achieve; procedures for using the training facility and other means of logistical support to the training process; immediate planning of combat training for troops and staffs; and elaboration of the plan for exercising supervision and giving assistance.⁶

The primary role in organizing and conducting combat training lay with commanders, staffs and political entities of air defense combined units and units. On the basis of orders of the commanders of air defense formations they would draw up the combat training program, monitor its fulfillment, and carry out specific measures to ensure implementation of outlined plans with consideration of existing conditions of the operational situation and performance of missions of reliable protection of defended installations. Meanwhile, the primary concerns of the command element and staffs of combined units and units were an increase in the level of combat schooling, ensuring that every soldier had a deep understanding of the fundamentals and features of the struggle against the air enemy, and an improvement in subunit personnel's weapons and tactical training. War experience was generalized and adopted by the troops. For example, in January 1942 the command element of the Transcaucasus Air Defense Zone issued a special order informing troops of everything new and foremost that had appeared during repulse of fascist German air raids on Leningrad and Moscow during the summer-fall campaign of 1941.⁷

Inasmuch as success in accomplishing this mission depended above all on the schooling of officer personnel, the command element and staffs of air defense combined units and units worked a great deal during the war years with commanders of all categories to deepen their knowledge and develop their skills in training subunit personnel. To this end commanders and chiefs of staff of combined units or their deputies would conduct classes with commanders and chiefs of staff of regiments. Regimental commanders would direct classes with battalion commanders, and battalion commanders would hold instructional classes with battery (company) commanders. The battery and company commanders in turn would work with platoon commanders, preparing them for classes with subordinates. In addition, it was a practice to hold courses for battery (company) and platoon commanders in which they studied manuals on the operation and employment of weapons and military equipment in the inventory.

According to instructions of the National Air Defense Forces Military Council the most important demand placed on command training classes was that all of them had to be conducted with high quality and that in them the senior officer taught subordinate commanders the methodology of conducting classes.⁸

/A determining indicator of commanders' combat schooling was considered to be their level of tactical, technical and weapons training./ Various conferences for an exchange of combat experience in which battery commanders who were experts of accurate fire, aces and other foremost commanders who had distinguished themselves in fighting gave reports and briefings had an important place in the improvement of tactical training and methods proficiency of commanders. Their presentations had a great mobilizing effect.

/An increase in the level of political knowledge and ideological conditioning of commanders, political workers and engineering-technical personnel was a subject of special concern for the command element./

Marxist-Leninist training classes would be held regularly with various categories of command-political personnel. Such classes would be arranged with commanders and political deputies of battalions, batteries and the equivalent officer categories at the regimental level, and with platoon commanders at the battalion level. The Communist Party's work at different stages in our state's development, questions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, the most important current political events, and questions of military indoctrination of personnel would be studied in the classes.

The focus of attention for the air defense command element in the war years was the training of staffs or, more precisely, command post operational groups which directly accomplished tasks of command and control during combat actions. They were prepared with consideration of the fact that speed and precision in controlling combat were the deciding conditions for success of the National Air Defense Forces, called upon to repulse swift enemy attacks. There were regular practices of CP teams for the purpose of increasing efficiency in the staffs' work among the troops. For example, daily practices of CP teams of combined units and units were introduced in accordance with an order of the commander of the Eastern Air Defense Front dated 15 August 1943.⁹

In addition to training officer personnel, /the command element and staffs gave much attention to increasing the military and political knowledge of NCO's/--gun commanders, chiefs of searchlight stations, chiefs of VNOS observation posts and chiefs of barrage balloon posts. Classes for perfecting military proficiency and mastering the methodology of training subordinates were organized and conducted regularly with them.

Commanders and staffs would focus primary attention on the weapons and tactical schooling of AAA teams, platoons, batteries and battalions and of fighter aviation flights and squadrons. Subunits of the VNOS service, especially the crews of different types of radar, were trained with great thoroughness.

All these activities were conducted under special plans drawn up by unit staffs with consideration of the concrete operational situation and the nature of fascist German air operations, and with assurance of constant, high combat readiness of the troops to repulse an enemy air attack on defended installations under all conditions.

/Well arranged and continuously conducted party-political work contributed to successful accomplishment of the tasks of improving troop combat schooling./

In mobilizing personnel for the most rapid qualitative mastery of weapons and military equipment, the commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations would use various forms and methods of party-political work: individual and group talks, rallies and personnel meetings; and they would organize political information briefings and publish operational news-sheets, instruction booklets and leaflets. All party-political work was aimed at revealing the objectives and nature of war and explaining missions of the air defense unit (combined unit) to defend installations as well as the concrete duties of air defense personnel in performing these missions.

It is important to stress that in addition to general political matters, current topics of troop combat training and combat readiness were presented in political classes such as "Master weapons to perfection," "Being a master of your work is a necessary condition for our victory," "Condition Number 1 is a fighting condition," "What kind of person a master of his work must be," "The time factor in air defense" and so on.¹⁰

Party and Komsomol members would encourage subunit personnel by their example to attain high indicators in combat schooling and performance of duties and would take advantage of every minute of free time for better mastery of equipment. They would work persistently to improve their military knowledge and the overwhelming majority mastered three or more related specialties. Gun crew members, communicators, and instrument operators would master the specialty of AAA range taker on the rangefinder, and personnel of logistical subunits would master duties as artillery and instrument team members. There was a determined struggle for an increase in the number of aces and masters of fire, searchlight and airwaves and, in VNOS units, for a reduction in time for passing reports from the company commander to the main post from 2-3 to 1.5 minutes.¹¹

Subunits' competition for the right to bear names of famous Great Patriotic War heroes became a great impetus in the struggle for high indicators in combat and political training. The best teams and squads would be given the names of Heroes of the Soviet Union. For example, an instrument squad of 12th Battery, 864th AAA Regiment, which achieved high indicators in training and performance of operational readiness, was given the name of HSU Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya; a gun crew of 1st Battery was given the name of HSU Aleksandr Matrosov; and a gun crew of 14th Battery was given the name of order-wearer and Komsomol member V. Gromyshev, a hero of this unit.¹²

The number of enemy aircraft shot down (by IA [fighter aviation] and ZA [AAA]) was the deciding criterion in evaluating results achieved by competitors, and quality of support was the criterion in support units (searchlight, VNOS, communications).

/Thus,/ Great Patriotic War experience convincingly indicates that no matter how improved the plans were for aligning air defense troop groupings and conducting combat actions, all this in itself still was not able to ensure a successful repulse of enemy air strikes. The success of air defense in the final account was achieved through the efforts of people mastering the weapons, having high combat schooling and possessing high moral-political qualities.

Therefore one of the chief functions of the command element, staffs, political entities and party organizations of the National Air Defense Forces throughout the entire past war was to provide for a continuous increase in their combat schooling and each air defense soldier's thorough understanding of the fundamentals and features of fighting the air enemy; an improvement in weapons and tactical training of subunit and unit (combined unit) personnel; and developing such qualities as courage, execution, initiative and so on in all soldiers. Experience indicated that training and indoctrination of personnel represented a unified process.

As shown by the past war's experience the content, forms and methods of Air Defense Forces combat training changed continuously in connection with the development of means of air attack and air defense weapons as well as with consideration of experience gained in combat actions.

One of the most important conclusions stemming from organization of troop training during the past war is that the planning of combat and political training of the Air Defense Forces must be accomplished with observance of the following principles: lack of stereotypes in planning (combat training plans must be aimed at a continuous increase in combat readiness and comprehensive consideration of troop experience); a reduction in the volume of planning documents by increasing their quality; efficiency in drawing up combat and political training plans by staffs at all levels; comprehensive consideration of the level of combat schooling achieved by personnel and foremost experience in organizing combat training; the reality of plans as one of the conditions for their successful implementation; consideration of demands for mastery of new equipment and weapons, and a constant search for new forms and methods of their tactical employment; an improvement in the effectiveness of combat training and in its qualitative indicators; independence and initiative of lower commanders and staffs; and the check and supervision of execution.

The experience gained in the Great Patriotic War of the organization and systematic conduct of measures for personnel training and indoctrination in the National Air Defense Forces during combat operations is of permanent importance. It has to be studied in detail and used imaginatively in the combat training of air defense units and combined units under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Na strazhe neba stolitsy" [Guarding the Capital's Sky], Voenizdat, 1968, p 81.
2. TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], stack 741, list 708648, file 1, sheet 82; "Voyska PVO strany v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941--1945. Kratkaya khronika" [The National Air Defense Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Concise Chronicle], Voenizdat, 1981, p 74.
3. "Bakinskiy okrug protivovozdushnoy oborony" [The Baku Air Defense District], Baku, 1974, pp 151-152.
4. TsAMO, stack 211, list 35258, file 1, sheet 57.
5. Ibid., stack 72, list 12274, file 579, sheets 193-195.
6. Ibid., list 161890, file 1, sheet 15.
7. Ibid., list 34748, file 115, sheet 71.

8. "Voyska protivovozhdushnoy oborony v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. Kratkaya khronika" [Air Defense Forces in the Great Patriotic War: Concise Chronicle], Voenizdat, 1981, p 196.
9. TsAMO, stack 72, list 648115, file 3, sheet 15.
10. "Na strazhe neba stolitsy," p 225.
11. Ibid., p 213.
12. Ibid., p 214.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION

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[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" and subheading "A Discussion of the Experience of Troop Support in Offensive Operations," by Chief of the M. V. Frunze Military Academy Col Gen P. Mel'nikov: "Operational Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (Maskirovka)"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] In the Soviet Army camouflage, concealment and deception as a kind of support saw development long before the Great Patriotic War. Back in the 1920's a theory of operational camouflage, concealment and deception was developed in Soviet military art as one of the most important means for achieving surprise in an operation. Prominent military theorists--M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. A. Svechin, A. I. Verkhovskiy and others--participated in resolving its problems. On the basis of experience of World War I and the Civil War they drew up the fundamentals for organizing and accomplishing camouflage, concealment and deception in a future war.

The theoretical studies were summarized in a draft manual entitled "Vyssheye komandovaniye" [Supreme Command].¹ It was noted here that the primary method of achieving surprise is operational camouflage, concealment and deception, which must be built on principles of activeness, naturalness, diversity, and continuity in carrying out its measures.

Prior to the Great Patriotic War there not only was a developed theory of operational camouflage, concealment and deception, but a certain amount of practical experience also had been gained in organizing and accomplishing it. For example, in defeating the Japanese troops on the Khalkhin-Gol River Soviet troops carried out operational camouflage, concealment and deception measures which helped lead the enemy astray and produced a good result.²

But the experience in organizing and conducting operational camouflage, concealment and deception during the Great Patriotic War is of greatest value for contemporary military art. It showed that with the purposeful conduct of activities it was possible to conceal from the enemy the concept of an operation, troop locations, composition, combat readiness and combat effectiveness, as well as achieve surprise in combat operations and increase the survivability of groupings.³ During the war various methods of camouflage,

concealment and deception were used and constantly perfected with consideration of the situation, upcoming missions, and capabilities of forces and weapons: concealment, imitation, demonstrations, and misinformation.

/In the first period, and especially at the beginning of the past war,/ the limited time periods for preparing operations (the Battle of Smolensk, the Vyaz'ma defensive operation, the counteroffensive at Moscow and others) as well as an absence of appropriate experience and a lack of personnel and means for conducting operational camouflage, concealment and deception often had a great influence on its organization and accomplishment. Even under these conditions, however, the command element of fronts and armies achieved concealment of plans for operations in many of the operations. The following measures contributed to this: creation of attack groupings at a considerable distance from the front line or to one side of the planned axis of main attack; accomplishment of troop regrouping only at night and their advance to initial areas for an offensive over a one or two day period; constantly preserving the established routine in areas where attacks were planned; conduct of reconnaissance across a broad front extending beyond the limit of where the main attack was to be delivered; reliable screening of the area for concentration of the main grouping against enemy ground and aerial reconnaissance; and the attack by troops from the move.

Of the above, it is necessary to take note of the special importance of an attack by troops from the move--one of the new methods of combat operations for that period which confused the enemy and caught him unawares. This method has not lost its importance even under present-day conditions.

A certain amount of experience in simulating a troop concentration in certain areas was gained in the first period of the war. It was believed that success of a dummy troop concentration was possible when enemy reconnaissance detected at least 20-25 percent of the amount of "troops" being simulated. Dummy objects must be no closer than 20 km from the actual object and must not be located with them on the probable axis of enemy flights.⁴

In addition, the first experience in simulating attack groupings permitted the conclusion that the expected results could be attained only if the process of demonstrating the dummy attack grouping of forces lasted right up until the actual grouping moved into the offensive, as was the case, for example, in the 20th Army in the Rzhev-Sychevka Operation in July 1942.

A major regrouping of forces during the heroic defense of Stalingrad was conducted in an exemplary manner in the first period. More than 96,500 train car loads of various cargoes arrived in this area in September-November 1942 alone. Each day 27,000 trucks were operating on roads near the front. In moving to the assembly area some combined units and units would make night marches of 300-400 km. From 1 through 20 November 160,000 soldiers crossed the Volga. As a result the enemy was led astray in this area with respect to our forces and means. A week before the counteroffensive by Soviet forces Germany's Ground Forces General Staff noted that "the enemy apparently does not have a sufficient amount of forces to begin extensive operations."⁶

Up to 1942 some camouflage, concealment and deception measures were reflected in operation plans, but the greater part were accomplished on the basis of written and verbal instructions. Subsequently the operations departments of front and army staffs began to draw up individual plans for camouflage, concealment and deception support of operations, which were implemented by the operations departments together with the staffs of engineer troops (the Demyansk Operation) or by specially assigned staffs for direction of operational camouflage, concealment and deception (the Rzhev-Sychevka Operation).

Thus by the end of the first period of the war Soviet troops actively began measures of operational camouflage, concealment and deception.

Troop operations and combat actions in the first period confirmed the great importance of camouflage, concealment and deception for success both on the defense and in the offensive. On the defense the greatest development occurred in camouflage, concealment and deception measures for concealing primary defensive lines and positions, a demonstration of the preparation of an offensive on defended axes and a deeply echeloned defense in weaker sectors, and denoting a dummy forward edge of defense; and on the offensive, concealment of the troop concentration, a demonstration of dummy attacks on secondary axes, and radio deception.

/The second period of the war/ was characterized by a further improvement in methods of operational camouflage, concealment and deception and by its conduct on broader scales.

In operations by groups of fronts the concept and objectives of operational camouflage, concealment and deception were determined by the V GK [Supreme High Command] Headquarters, and in independent operations by formations they usually were determined by the commanders in chief of the formations. Operational camouflage, concealment and deception measures, however, were accomplished only in the preparatory period of an operation, which limited the opportunities for leading the enemy astray in the course of an operation.⁷

In preparing for an upcoming offensive front and army staffs would draw up operational camouflage, concealment and deception plans. These usually indicated the overall objective (concept), measures for camouflage, concealment and deception, the personnel and means for accomplishing them, deadlines, as well as performers and persons responsible for supervising implementation of the plan. On the basis of this document the front (army) staff would issue instructions for camouflage, concealment and deception which set forth the objective, general missions and time periods for conducting the activities, and determined those responsible for them and the assigned forces and means.

Plans for operational camouflage, concealment and deception were drawn up most completely by its chief performers--army staffs. For example, areas of simulation and who was to accomplish the activities and supervision were determined and provisions were made for a demonstration of preparations for the arrival of troops, a simulation of their disposition in assembly areas as well as the simulation of preparations for an offensive by the combined units engaged in defense in 38th Army (the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation in July-August 1943).

The creation of staffs or operations groups for directing measures for operational camouflage, concealment and deception began in formations in the second period of the war. The staffs or groups included specialists from the primary departments of a staff and from combat arms and services. A strict limitation of the number of persons participating in drawing up an operation and in correspondence about it played an important part in increasing the effectiveness of camouflage, concealment and deception. All personnel were familiarized with the mission usually a day or several hours before the beginning of combat operations.

Troop regroupings and movements and the preparation of initial areas and positions for the offensive were accomplished exclusively at night. Creation of a 25-km zone near the front from which the local populace was evacuated during the time operations were prepared and conducted also contributed to the fight against enemy agents. Artillery registration was conducted one or two days before the beginning of an operation by individual pieces (ranging guns), one from each battalion. The commanders of combined units about which the enemy had previous knowledge were responsible for concealing the concentration of attack groupings. They would organize reconnaissance in broad zones which did not reveal the direction of the offensive being prepared. In the period when troops were regrouping and an operation was being prepared it was prohibited to operate radios in the new areas or give information in situation reports involving the movement of combined units and units; and it was the practice for radios previously known to the enemy to operate at the old locations. More attention began to be given to concealing military rail movements, especially of tanks and artillery. Unloading stations were designated across the entire frontage of formations and were changed every two or three days. Personnel and equipment were unloaded only at night. After completing the unloading, units would move immediately to assembly areas which were carefully camouflaged.

Our forces gained much experience in using screening smoke for blinding enemy observation posts and weapons emplacements and for concealing the advance of infantry and tanks to zones of attack. Smoke was used often for purposes of concealing assault crossing areas and for demonstrating dummy crossings. For example, in the assault crossing of the Dnepr in October 1943 smoke generation was accomplished in 65th Army (the commander was Lt Gen P. I. Batov) at the beginning of the crossing simultaneously in 13 sectors across a front extending some 30 km. Such a large number of smoke screens across a broad front not only concealed assault crossing areas from the enemy, but also led him astray.

The experience of demonstrating dummy troop operations and simulating the creation of major groupings and the preparation of operations on dummy axes also saw development in the second period. Significant forces began to be assigned for this purpose. For example, in preparations for and during the Battle of Kursk in the 38th Army (commanded by Maj Gen Arty K. S. Moskalenko and, as of 3 August 1943, by Lt Gen N. Ye. Chibisov), the 340th Rifle Division, 260th Separate Combat Engineer Battalion, 32d Separate Engineer Mine-laying Company and the 22d Separate Engineer Camouflage Company were used at full strength for camouflage, concealment and deception measures, with the

additional activation of 7 radios, 18 trucks, 8 tanks, a temporary train (20 cars), 450 tank mock-ups and, from 29 through 31 July, 2-3 aircraft each. Real troops were used to demonstrate "active" sectors and aircraft overflights of dummy areas were arranged.⁸

During the second period of the war as a whole there was a transition from separate measures for deception of the enemy to the conduct of an entire complex of them, from individual instructions of commanders for operational camouflage, concealment and deception to elaboration of the plan and creation of special staffs for directing it. As a result operational camouflage, concealment and deception produced a great effect in almost all operations. Our troops' actions often proved to be unexpected to the enemy and he was deprived of an opportunity to undertake timely countermeasures so as to disrupt them.

/In the third period of the war/ a further increase in scope and even greater diversity of operational camouflage, concealment and deception was typical of its development. This was reflected in the conduct of reconnaissance in force across a broad front simultaneously in the zones of several fronts and armies, in the conduct of more vigorous actions by aviation on main axes and simultaneously on secondary axes, in the preparation of offensive operations on several axes at the same time, in the mass employment of smokes and so on.

The drafts of the 1943 Red Army Field Service Regulations and the 1944 Manual for Penetration of a Positional Defense played an important part in improving the organization and conduct of operational camouflage, concealment and deception.

The most instructive operations with regard to operational camouflage, concealment and deception in this period were the Leningrad-Novgorod, Korsun'-Shevchenkivskiy, Belorussian, L'vov-Sandomierz, Jassy-Kishinev and others. As a rule provisions were made in these operations for concealing preparation of the offensive as a whole, the attack grouping of troops and the axis of main attack. The plans included measures for camouflage, concealment and deception both during preparations and in the course of the operations.

The front staff was the primary organizer of operational camouflage, concealment and deception. It planned and organized coordination, determined the extent of participation of combat arms in the measures to be conducted, drew up instructions and exercised supervision over implementation of the plans.

It should be noted, however, that even in the third period of the war operational camouflage, concealment and deception often was planned for influencing only enemy aerial reconnaissance and visual observation. Little attention was given to his clandestine intelligence. The importance of this matter rose in connection with the shift of combat actions to enemy territory. Weather conditions in the area of dummy concentration also were not always properly considered. As before, there were no representatives of intelligence departments on the staffs (in operations groups) for direction of camouflage, concealment and deception measures. Therefore there were instances where the staffs (or groups) did not always receive timely data on the enemy and were not able to react swiftly to his actions.

Concealment of friendly intentions from the enemy received further development in the third period of the war. An even more restricted circle of individuals took part in planning operations. The front (army) staff would draw up a special schedule for the sequence and extent of making missions known to the performers. Measures prohibiting the operation of radio equipment or the conduct of telephone conversations on matters concerning preparation of an operation played a significant role in keeping the plan secret.

Special attention was given to concealment of troop regroupings. All of their movements and delivery of supplies were accomplished only at night or in bad flying weather. The front staff would draw up a unified plan for regrouping in its own zone and set up special control groups made up of representatives of the front and armies, which would receive arriving troops and direct them to assembly areas (five combined-arms armies and one tank and air army were regrouped prior to the Memel Operation in 1944 and the same number before the Berlin Operation of 1945). Tank groupings were assigned assembly areas at a considerable distance from the forward line (the 6th Guards TA [Tank Army] in the Budapest and Manchurian operations). Several variants of their commitments to battles were planned. Artillery would be placed in the reserve of the front (army) commander ahead of time and would move up to new areas only directly before the beginning of the operation.

Other measures were accomplished in addition to concealing the attack grouping as the primary revealing sign of the axis of main attack. Reconnaissance and terrain reconnaissance were conducted throughout the zone of a front (or army). Aircraft would deliver strikes on different axes without singling out the axis for concentration of main efforts.

Monitoring of the camouflage, concealment and deception measures from the air and radio monitoring played an important role in concealment. This was carried out by officer-operators.

Methods of dummy and demonstration troop actions as well as deception also continued to develop in the third period of the war. They were characterized by the large scale of troop simulation and the demonstration of an entire complex of activities of preparing an offensive. Incidental marches by units, their day's halts in dummy areas, and dummy routes and crossings were used for greater plausibility in the interests of demonstration actions (the Belorussian, Jassy-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations).

The scale of operational camouflage, concealment and deception also increased in the third period of the war, including through a demonstration of dummy actions by larger groupings of forces and means. A feature of these measures was the fact that fewer rifle troops but more units and subunits from engineer, tank, air defense and chemical troops, aviation, and artillery began to be used for them. For example, prior to the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation the demonstration of a dummy concentration of two tank armies on the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front was planned (see Document No 1) as early as 11 June in order to conceal the true axis of main attack and concept of operations. To this end a number of measures for operational camouflage, concealment and deception were carried out among the troops, in 18th Army for example, on the basis of the army commander's order (Document No 2).

Document No 1

"APPROVED"

Commander of 1st Ukrainian Front
Mar SU Konev

Member of Military Council of 1st
Ukrainian Front Lt Gen Kraynyukov

11 June 1944

Plan of Measures for Operational (mouflage,
Concealment and Deception in the 1st Ukrainian Front Zone

| Missions | Area Where Measures Conducted | Time Periods | Persons Responsible | Total Forces and Means | Note |
|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| /1st Gds Army/ Demonstrate a tank army concentration | | | | | |
| /18th Army/ Demonstrate a tank army concentration: | Vinograd, Kolomyia, Zabolotuv, Rudna Station | Beginning and end of work and demonstration by special order | Cmdr 18th Army | Rif bns: 2 Engr bns: 2 Arty batteries: 3 AAA regts: 1 Tank co: 1 Ftr avn flt: 1 Radio co: 1 Chem co: 1 Tank mock-ups: 500 Vehicle mock-ups: 200 Gun mock-ups: 600 Train mock-ups: 2 Field kitchen mock-ups: 100 Smokepots: 5,000 Sound units: 2 Tractors: 4 Vehicles: 15 Motorcycles: 10 | Responsible staff officer of 1st Ukrainian Front Engr-Maj Momotov |
| a. Arrival and unloading of tanks on railroad | | | Chief of 18th Arm Engr Trps | | |
| b. Tank movement to assembly area | Over roads: Rudna Station... | | Cmdr of armd and mech trps of 18th Arm | | |
| c. Occupation of initial areas | Locations for special ground recon | " | Chief of 18th Arm Engr Trps | | |
| d. Trp bivouacking | " | " | " | | |

[Continued on next page]

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|--|---|---|--|---|---|
| e. Deception of local populace by special measures | In movement and concentration areas | " | Chief of 18th Arm Engr Trps and political department | | 200 persons of 23d uo[o?] [possibly special sections directorate] of RGK [High Cmd Res] |
| f. Screening concentration from the air | " | " | 18th Arm arty cmdr, cmdr of 10th iak [ftr corps] | | |
| g. Radio deception | Army RBS [probably type of radio] ... Corps ... | " | 18th Arm sig officer | | |
| h. Blanketing initial positions on day of attack | By special order | " | 18th Arm chief of chem serv | | |

Chief of staff of 1st UF
[Ukrainian Front]
Arm Gen Sokolovskiy

Deputy commander and chief of engineer
troops of 1st UF
Lt Gen Engr Trps Galitskiy

From Ministry of Defense Central Archives, stack 236, list 2698, file 353, sheets 24-26

Document No 2

"To carry out instructions and in conformity with the plan of the 1st Ukrainian Front commander

I ORDER:

1. Perform simulation of tank army concentration in vicinity of Vinograd, Kolomyia, Zabolotuv in the period from 4 through 20 July 1944.

2. For immediate direction of all simulation measures assign an operations group made up of the following: chief of operations group--deputy chief of army staff operations department Col Soloveykin, Col Stopog from engineer
[Continued on next page.]

Document No 2 [Continued from previous page.]

troops staff, Lt Col Yakovlev from artillery staff, Col Pisarikhin from staff of BT i MV [armored and mechanized troops], Lt Col Fiktor from communications department, Lt Col Shcherbak from political department, Engr-Maj Nikul'chenko from VOSO [military transportation] department, and Lt Col Barten'yev from the chemical department.

3. Subordinate operations group directly to army chief of staff and provide it with means of transportation from the 201st Motor Transport Platoon.

4. My deputy for engineer troops Col Comrade Zhurin is to ensure the building of 500 tank mock-ups, 200 vehicle mock-ups, 600 gun mock-ups, and 100 field kitchen mock-ups using resources of two engineer battalions and two rifle battalions from the 66th Guards Rifle Division by 20 July 1944, placing them in areas according to the plan...

5. The artillery commander is to place three gun batteries on mechanical traction and one AAA regiment for screening assembly areas at the disposal of the chief of the operations group.

6. The commander of BT i MV is to place two batteries at the operations group chief's disposal from the 1448th sap [Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment] and five motorcycles for use in unloading and assembly areas.

7. Army signal officer Maj Gen Comrade Murav'yev is to arrange a dummy radio link according to the plan of the front signal officer for deception of the enemy, having the army RSB in Soroki and corps RSB's in the areas of Vinograd and Kobylets.

8. Political department chief Col Comrade Brezhnev is to place one MGU [powerful loudspeaker] sound broadcasting station at the disposal of the operations group chief and together with the chief of the army staff intelligence department organize deception of the local populace with respect to the concentration of major tank forces and offensive being prepared in the army sector. Use 15 officers for spreading false information among the populace.

9. VOSO chief Col Comrade Zelenin is to support through the front VOSO the measures being carried out by rolling stock (a locomotive, 30 flatcars and 3 boxcars). Arrange the train's progress according to the schedule of the operations group chief.

10. My deputy for rear services Maj Gen Comrade Baranov is to support uninterrupted operation of motor transport for the entire period of the activities, releasing fuel on requisitions of the army chief of engineer troops with my approval.

11. Chief of the army chemical service is to provide blanketing in vicinity of Stefaneshiti Station, Yasunuv Pol'ny Station, 1-2 km west of Dzurkuv and 1-2 km south of Venyava, assigning the chemical company of 66th Guards Rifle Division and 5,000 smoke pots for this purpose.

[Continued on next page.]

Document No 2 [Continued from previous page.]

12. Engr-Maj Momotov, representative of 1st UF staff, provides consultation on matters of operational camouflage, concealment and deception.

13. Report daily to operations group chief on progress of simulation work...

Commander of 18th Army
Lt Gen Zhuravlev

Member of Military Council of 18th Army
Maj Gen Kolonin

Chief of Staff of 18th Army
Lt Gen Ozerov."⁹

A transition was made in the spreading of false information from the dissemination of false rumors among friendly troops and the local populace to bringing influence directly on the enemy: It became a more frequent practice to abandon dummy combat documents, notebooks and letters and to conduct dummy telephone conversations. In the final phase of the war, especially in an offensive from bases of operation, dummy defensive work often was carried out for the purpose of demonstrating troops' transition to a protracted defense.

Smoke capabilities were used widely for camouflage, concealment and deception in offensive operations of the third period. While the width of the smoke screening front in army offensive operations of 1943 comprised an average of 30-50 percent of the zone of advance, it was 75 percent in operations of 1944, and often reached 100 percent in 1945 in some armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front. One can judge the effectiveness of smoke concealment of objects by such data as the screening of crossings. In 1945 an average of 94 crossings were screened with smoke each month. The enemy flew 12,400 sorties to bomb them in a four-month period. Of the 9,700 bombs dropped only 37, or 0.4 percent, hit the target. In a number of cases the aircraft were not able to conduct bombing at all.¹⁰

And so in the third period of the war operational camouflage, concealment and deception was conducted on broader scales not only in the period of preparation, but throughout the operation as a whole. Camouflage, concealment and deception measures were coordinated in more detail within the zones of several fronts when organizing and conducting operations on several axes. The spreading of false information was perfected and there was an expansion in the frontage of its effect on various means used by the enemy to obtain information.

On the whole operational camouflage, concealment and deception in the third period of the war was distinguished by activeness, plausibility, continuity of conduct, diversity of methods, and by the participation of all staffs and combat arms of operational formations in their implementation. It greatly contributed to attainment of the operation's objective.

The Great Patriotic War's experience proved that operational camouflage, concealment and deception, being one of the primary kinds of operational

support, allows achieving, with its careful organization, concealment of the concept of an operation and the status and character of troop actions, it permits achieving surprise, and it contributes to an increase in the survivability of groupings. An analysis of its organization and conduct during the war provides an opportunity to identify the following trends in its development: an expansion in scope, an increase in the activeness of camouflage, concealment and deception measures, their coordination with each other and with actual troop operations, a more detailed consideration of the capabilities of enemy intelligence, and an increase in concreteness of planning and effectiveness of supervision over the effectualness of measures conducted.

The war also showed that the following primary requirements have to be observed to ensure effectiveness of camouflage, concealment and deception:

- Consideration of the actual capabilities of all kinds of enemy intelligence and constant opposition to it;

- Elaboration of the camouflage, concealment and deception plan based on the concept of a given operation, and conformity of the concept and primary measures of operational camouflage, concealment and deception with the actual capabilities of friendly troops to carry it out;

- Detailed planning of all measures for camouflage, concealment and deception and centralized direction of their conduct;

- Activeness, convincing nature, continuity and diversity of the activities, their systematic character, and employment of different methods of camouflage, concealment and deception;

- The initiative and imagination of commanders who organize and carry out the camouflage, concealment and deception measures.

Political entities and party organizations played a large role in successful conduct of operational camouflage, concealment and deception in the war years. They mobilized party members and all personnel of combined units and units for thorough accomplishment of planned activities.

The experience of organizing and accomplishing operational camouflage, concealment and deception in the past war is of current significance even under present-day conditions. At the same time it has to be applied imaginatively with consideration of the new means and methods of armed warfare and new means of reconnaissance and camouflage, concealment and deception.

The increased capabilities of all kinds of reconnaissance may significantly hinder accomplishment of missions to achieve surprise in troop actions. Therefore the methods and techniques of operational camouflage, concealment and deception developed during the Great Patriotic War have to be developed and perfected constantly.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Vysshaye komandovaniye. Ofitsial'noye rukovodstvo dlya komanduyushchikh i polevykh upravleniy armiy i frontov" [Supreme Command: Official Manual for Commanders and Field Directorates of Armies and Fronts], Izd-vo Vysshego voyennogo redaktsionnogo soveta, 1924.

2. G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Memoirs and Reflections], Vol 1, 2d ed., supplemented, Moscow, izd. APN, 1975, pp 173-177.
3. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1971, pp 45-52; No 1, 1972, pp 11-12; No 6, 1972, pp 29-40; No 1, 1974, pp 10-25; No 8, 1974, pp 11-21; No 1, 1975, pp 10-25; No 9, 1981, pp 19-24.
4. TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], stack 236, list 34586, file 11, sheets 4-5.
6. "Istoriya velikoy otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941--1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1961, p 15.
7. "Sbornik voyenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoy otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Military Historical Materials of the Great Patriotic War], 12th issue, Voenizdat, 1953, p 75.
8. TsAMO, stack 393, list 55519, file 9, sheets 4-9.
9. Ibid., stack 236, list 2698, file 353, sheets 32-33.
10. "Primeneniye dymov v boyu i operatsii" [Employment of Smokes in Combat and the Operation], Voenizdat, 1975, p 7.

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ORIGIN OF SOLDIER'S SERVICE AND PAY BOOK RECOUNTED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 24 Mar 82) pp 36-38

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Col (Ret) S. Skryabin: "From the History of the Red Army Service and Pay Book"]

[Text] The first months of the Great Patriotic War were under way. Fierce, bloody battles, unprecedented in scope, developed over an enormous expanse from the Barents to the Black Sea.

Soviet troops required a colossal amount of supplies daily to conduct combat operations: ammunition, fuels and lubricants, rations, forage and other military property. Red Army rear control entities, created at the beginning of August 1941, worked around the clock to arrange uninterrupted supply of the troops. Lt Gen Intend Serv A. V. Khrulev, deputy people's commissar of defense and chief of the Red Army, made a daily report to Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin about the troop supply situation. In one such visit in early October, as Khrulev told us workers of the Rear staff, Stalin asked him:

"Why are German soldiers dressed in Red Army uniforms showing up in some of our units? They move freely from one unit to another and commit espionage and sabotage acts."

"Comrade Stalin, the Red Army men have no documents," responded Khrulev. "Therefore any saboteur fluent in the Russian language can put on our uniform and show up where he likes and do what he likes."

"What do you mean there are no documents?" Stalin repeated in surprise.

"Quite simply, Iosif Vissarionovich. The Red Army service and pay book instituted by NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] Order dated 20 June 1940 was valid only for peacetime. In wartime it is considered invalid. Before units are sent to the front Red Army service and pay books are confiscated from personnel with nothing issued in their place."

The Supreme Commander was terribly upset by such a procedure and ordered Khrulev to develop a new Red Army service and pay book immediately for certifying the identity of the Red Army man and junior commander and in which, in

In addition, it would be possible to make entries about the serviceman's service in the Red Army and his receipt of weapon, gear and uniform.

On arriving in the directorate Khrulev summoned Col G. N. Dankov, chief of the organizational department of the Rear staff, and myself, his deputy, and ordered us to develop a draft Red Army service and pay book urgently, coordinating it with interested services. This work was directly assigned to me.

For convenience of using the book it seemed to me that it should have just two sheets. On the first page I deemed it necessary to place the name of the document and on the second page the last name, first name and patronymic of the holder, his position and military rank, as well as the designation of the unit (or establishment) and subunit (battalion, company), identity disc number, and a place for the book holder to sign. A place was left in the lower left corner of that same page for a photograph, and a place was left in the lower right corner for the commander's signature and date filled in. General information would be entered on the third page: year of birth, nationality, year called up, by whom called up. On the last page it was planned to include all remaining information.

On instruction of Gen Khrulev the draft Red Army service and pay book had to be coordinated with the chiefs of certain services.

When we presented this document to Maj Gen M. P. Milovskiy, chief of staff of the Rear, he suggested keeping an entry of general information about the book holder on the fourth page (place of birth, home address, last name, first name and patronymic of wife or parents) and to add another two pages: One was to note the course of service and the other, participation in campaigns as well as incentives.

On becoming familiar with the document, Maj Gen P. D. Davydov, chief quartermaster of the Red Army, gave instructions to increase the book by another four pages where, in his opinion, information should be given about the soldier being provided with clothing. And when I went to Gen I. I. Volkotrubenko, first deputy chief of the Main Artillery Directorate, he suggested adding one more page for accounting for weapons, gear and technical property which Red Army men and junior commanders drew.

As a result the Red Army service and pay book had come to have 12 pages already and we were afraid that Stalin would reject it. But inasmuch as the increase in the book's volume was the result of suggestions of the services, we did not dare reduce the number of sheets in it.

On 3 October 1941 I prepared a draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense and briefed it to Gen Khrulev. The order consisted only of one paragraph which spoke of the institution of the Red Army service and pay book as a document certifying the identity of the Red Army man and junior commander in wartime. Orders usually announced the implementation of instructions, statutes, manuals and other documents in such a concise format.

That same day Andrey Vasil'yevich took both documents to Stalin, who read the Red Army service and pay book attentively and returned it to Khrulev with the words:

"I approve, but on the face there should be printed: 'Always keep the Red Army service and pay book with you. Detain those without books.' Prepare instructions on the procedure for filling in and keeping up the Red Army service and pay book."

He kept the draft order on the introduction of the Red Army service and pay book.

Two days went by but Stalin had not returned the document. Khrulev apparently did not dare ask him about this and was getting very nervous, for the Supreme Commander had ordered issuing the Red Army service and pay book immediately.

Finally on 6 October, after listening to Khrulev's routine briefing about the troops' state of supply, Stalin also handed him this document.

"I touched up the order a bit," he said. "Retype it and submit it for signature tomorrow."

When I looked through it, only the title remained of my document. The text of the order had been crossed out and beneath it was a new one written in blue pencil with Stalin's customary handwriting. After completing the first page, Stalin turned it over and began to write on the reverse side, then took another three sheets of paper and filled them in on both sides. What resulted was a thoroughly thought out document of great practical significance for the troops.

On returning to the directorate Khrulev assembled all department chiefs of the Red Army Rear staff and chiefs of the highway and main military medical directorate, inasmuch as all of them then were located in the same building (ul. Gor'kogo, 20).

"Comrades!" he said. "I assembled you to show you how to process staff documents and how the Supreme Commander Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin operates. He recently assigned me to draw up a Red Army service and pay book certifying the identity of our soldiers. We did this and it has been approved. But in order to implement the book, as you know, we need an order of the People's Commissar of Defense. We prepared it and submitted it to Comrade Stalin for signature. Just the title remained of our order, and all the later text was written by Comrade Stalin's hand."

And Andrey Vasil'yevich showed to those assembled the sheets closely written in blue pencil. Then he shifted to an official tone of voice.

"Inasmuch as this order is of great interest and it has been suggested that it be made known to all supervisory personnel, permit me to announce it from Comrade Stalin's rough copy."

Then Khrulev read the text of the order. When the chief of the Rear finished the reading there was a deathlike silence. Everyone sat astounded not only by the content of the order but also by the fact that such a seemingly ordinary document had been drawn up by a person up to his neck in state, political, national economic and military affairs, and at the moment when the enemy was rushing toward Moscow.

On the following day, 7 October, People's Commissar of Defense I. V. Stalin signed the order introducing the Red Army service and pay book. It stated in part: ". . . Immediately introduce the Red Army service and pay book with photograph of the holder, according to the announced sample, in all units and establishments of the Red Army both in the rear and at the front...

"The Red Army service and pay book is to be considered the only document certifying the identity of the Red Army man and junior commander. Enter in the Red Army service and pay book the serviceman's performance of military service and his receipt from the military department of allowance items (weapon, gear and clothing).

"Red Army service and pay books are to be issued to Red Army men and junior commanders from the moment they are enrolled in the unit. The books are to be kept up by commanders or deputy commanders of companies, squadrons, batteries and teams.

"On checking the information entered, chiefs of staff of military units are to apply the unit seal to the book.

"Red Army service and pay books are to be issued strictly according to the rolls and are to be signed for personally by the Red Army men and junior commanders.

"The presence of Red Army service and pay books of Red Army men and junior commanders is to be checked: daily at morning inspections in units in the rear; at the first opportunity, at the discretion of company commanders, but at least once every three days in combat units.

"Every Red Army man and junior commander is to have the Red Army service and pay book with him constantly. Red Army men and junior commanders without Red Army service and pay books are to be detained as suspicious and sent to military commandants' offices for clarification of identity.

"Red Army service and pay books are to be issued for the entire time of service of the Red Army man and junior commander in the Red Army.

"With transfers from one subunit to another or to another unit, Red Army men and junior commanders are to keep the Red Army service and pay books with them, presenting them at the new duty location.

"Commanders of companies, squadrons, batteries and teams are to note in the book any change in service of Red Army men and junior commanders, and the issue and turn-in of military property they have drawn in no manner other than in the presence of the Red Army man or junior commander to whom the book belongs...

"On visiting subordinate units, inspectors of the combat arms and services as well as all immediate superiors are to check that Red Army men and junior commanders have the Red Army service and pay book and that they are being kept up correctly."¹

This same order also promulgated the "Instruction on Procedure for Filling in and Keeping up the Red Army Service and Pay Book."

The issue of Red Army service and pay books to Red Army men and junior commanders in the rear and at the front had an immediate effect on an increase in vigilance among the troops, sharply reduced the probability of enemy agents penetrating into units, and helped regulate the registration of personnel in units and combined units.

1. TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], stack 2, list 920266, file 2, sheets 840-843.

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COMMENTS ON 'BOURGEOIS FALSIFICATION' OF BATTLE OF MOSCOW IN WW II

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[Article, published under the heading "Against the Bourgeois Falsifiers of History," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col B. Nevzorov: "Why This Lie is Necessary: On the Question of the Bourgeois Falsification of the Battle of Moscow"]

[Text] The Battle of Moscow is of great significance in attainment of victory in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht's shock forces suffered their first major defeat, the plan for a blitzkrieg was disrupted, the myth of the invincibility of Hitler's Army was laid to rest and the stage was set for a fundamental turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War in its engagements. Enemy losses in personnel alone during the Battle of Moscow were 567,000 from 1 October 1941 through 31 March 1942.¹

Just what explanation did the leaders of the Third Reich give for the reasons for their shameful defeat at the walls of Moscow? They were not able to tell the truth and so they resorted to a tested method: juggling and deception. Hitler laid the blame on climatic conditions for failure of the operation to seize Moscow. He asserted that the advance of German forces, begun successfully, was delayed by the very bad road conditions and unusually low temperatures. This marked the beginning of the falsification of the history of the Battle of Moscow, which has been continuing for 40 years now. There are lies from defeated Hitlerite generals K. Tippelskirch, W. Warlimont, B. (Kraype), (V. Shal' de Bol'ye), American historians R. Jones, J. Jukes, T. Dupuy, F. (Iratt), A. Turney, (Ye. Khal't), (Kh.) Hughes and V. Esposito; British analysts H. Baldwin, J. Butler, (Dzh. Guayyer), K. Davies, B. Collier, J. Fuller, P. Young and others.² In fulfilling the social order of the military-industrial complex, they attempt to recarve events of World War II in the interests of imperialism, erase the truth about the great battle in the people's memory, and give the young generation a distorted impression of our victory at Moscow. Three primary directions can be identified in the falsifiers' publications: an attempt to hush up the Battle of Moscow or place it in the same rank with actions of Anglo-American forces at secondary fronts; degrading the achievements of Soviet military art; and distorting the true reasons for the defeat of fascist German troops on approaches to the Soviet capital.

The bourgeois "theory of decisive battles" of World War II, which occurred primarily at those fronts where the western allies were fighting, serves as the initial basis for the present-day falsification. The role of the Soviet-German front and the world-historic importance of the victory at Moscow thus is degraded. For example, in his book "Battles Lost and Won...",³ H. Baldwin did not include the Battle of Moscow at all among the 11 major battles of World War II, i.e., he completely ignored it. In the monograph entitled "World War II,"⁴ B. Liddel Hart devoted only a few lines out of the more than 650 pages of text to military actions at Moscow.

It should be noted that under the influence of Marxist military-historical science, which exposed this "theory," bourgeois historians in the 1970's have been forced to admit that the Battle of Moscow was of decisive importance for the course and outcome of World War II. In a new book this same H. Baldwin writes that the Battle of Moscow "was without doubt a turning point in World War II even greater than Stalingrad."⁵ West German historian K. Reinhardt concludes in the work entitled "Die Wende vor Moskau" [The Turning Point at Moscow] that "Hitler's strategy aimed at the winning of world domination by his Reich suffered defeat" at Moscow.⁶ H. Maule includes the Battle of Moscow among the 13 great battles of World War II,⁷ and the work edited by N. Frankland and C. Dowling ranks it among the 14 decisive battles of the 20th century.⁸ But the Battle of El Alamein, the American landing on the island of Guadalcanal and the operation of British troops at Imphal (in Berma) are ranked with the Battle of Moscow in these works.

The antisoviet direction of the bourgeois "theory of decisive battles" is obvious, just as is its scientific insolvency. This is indicated by the incompatibility of the scope and, most important, of the results and military-political consequences of operations by western allies in comparison with the engagements at Moscow. Suffice it to say that in October 1941 the total strength of the fascist German Army Group Center was over 1.8 million persons while Rommel's grouping numbering some 80,000 men was operating at El Alamein, the American landing on Guadalcanal was opposed by a 30,000-man Japanese garrison, and the British troops at Imphal were opposed by 84,000 Japanese officers and men.⁹ Even lumped together, the three operations by the western allies mentioned above did not have a decisive influence on the enemy and so no comparison at all can be made with the Battle of Moscow.

A considerable number of present-day bourgeois historians try to degrade the achievements of Soviet military art in operations at Moscow in their publications. To this end they conceal or distort the relative strengths and means of the sides, juggle events, and select the facts tendentiously.

Creation of superiority over the enemy is considered one of the main tasks of military art, although its presence still does not guarantee success, as was the case with the Hitlerites in the Battle of Moscow. In analyzing the results of an operation or action it is very important to know the relative forces and means of the sides. In the Battle of Moscow the overall correlation of forces was 1.4-2 times in favor of the fascist German troops, and from 8 to 12 times in their favor in the breakthrough sectors.¹⁰ Just how is this indicator presented to the reader by bourgeois historians? Let's turn

for an example to Reinhardt's work "Die Wende vor Moskau." The author chose the material so that it is impossible to compare impressions of the correlation of forces of the opposing sides from his data at the beginning of the battle (p 72), at the beginning of the counteroffensive (pp 239-240), or at the beginning of the general offensive (pp 292-296). In the first instance he focuses the readers' attention on shortcomings in support to Army Group Center, "forgetting" to show that in order to capture Moscow the Hitlerites had set up a grouping with a significant superiority over Soviet troops. Like many other bourgeois historians, Reinhardt consciously avoids analyzing the grouping's make-up. But it was unique in its own way, for the fascist German command never had concentrated such enormous forces before to capture a single objective. Not once during World War II except in this operation had it deployed three panzer groups out of the four available at the entire Soviet-German front on a single axis. More panzer and motorized divisions were targeted against Moscow alone than in May 1940 against France, Belgium and Holland together (22 and 17 divisions respectively). With a clear superiority over Soviet troops, the offensive by the Hitlerites on Moscow ended in a disgraceful failure. Revealing the truth to the reader and showing the relative strengths at which this occurred means admitting the superiority of Soviet military art over that of the enemy. This would contradict the goals of the campaign conducted against our country by imperialism. Therefore the author makes wide use even further of a calculatingly programmed scheme for distorting the truth.

In examining the situation before the beginning of the counteroffensive and the general offensive of Soviet troops at Moscow, Reinhardt substitutes demagogic reflections to the effect that "the German troops were at the limit of their forces both from the standpoint of weapons and in the psychological and physical sense and just the appearance of new enemy combined units was sufficient for the front to waver" (p 239) for a scientific study of the correlation of forces. It should be noted that under the effect of "numerous Soviet books about the Battle of Moscow" available in West Germany (p 26) and in contrast to books published in the FRG previously, Reinhardt's work no longer has a direct statement about the twentyfold superiority of Soviet troops which allegedly permitted throwing the Hitlerites back from Moscow.¹² Nevertheless, the author attempts to create the impression that numerical superiority still was on the side of the Russians. This line runs through the entire description of offensive actions by Soviet troops in December and January. As a matter of fact, the German side retained a superiority of 1.4-1.6 times in personnel, artillery and tanks.¹³ Maintaining silence about this, Reinhardt tries to understate the success of Soviet troops and suggests the thought that the Soviet Army won not by ability, but by numbers, so as to discredit it.

And American analyst E. Ziemke resorts to a direct forgery in attempting to stress the numerical superiority of Soviet troops over the fascist German forces. For example, he writes that in December 1941 troops of the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the Western Front had a 1.5 times superiority in tanks and artillery over the Hitlerites before the beginning of the offensive northwest of Moscow.¹⁴ In confirming these data, he refers to the "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Great

Patriotic War of the Soviet Union] (Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1963, p 277). As a matter of fact, on the page given by Ziemke, this book says quite the opposite: Superiority remained on the side of the fascist German troops in artillery and tanks in this sector of the front.

The bourgeois falsifiers ((Kh.) Hughes, (G. Frisner), K. Reinhardt and others) see the reasons for the fascist German Army's defeat in 1941 in the German equipment's lack of adaptation to conditions of the Russian winter, a lack of antifreeze, winter clothing and so on. They suggest the idea that had this Army been directed by professional military men, and not "upstarts" such as Hitler, and had it had more reliable allies, the outcome of the war might have been quite different. And Ziemke goes further. He lays a bridge to "future possibilities," giving to understand that with such allies as the United States for Germany, the Soviet Union would be deprived of a numerical superiority, there again would appear "high quality" of the German military art, and victory in a future war would be on their side.¹⁵

One of the important indicators of an offensive operation in military art is the rate of troop advance. In his work Reinhardt cites what are on the whole correct figures. For example, he states that from 30 September through 2 October the 2d Panzer Group advanced at a rate of 60 km per day. In the latter half of October this dropped to 5.3 km per day (p 113). But by confusing the maximum and average values, the author directs the reader's thought to the fact that a drop in tempo is a commonplace thing in an offensive. By the end of an operation it allegedly always is lower than at its beginning. Here Reinhardt "forgets" to point out the increase in force of opposition of the Soviet troops and the growth in stability of their defense. There were sufficient examples of this. For example, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps commanded by Maj Gen D. Lelyushenko, which had not been completely activated, formed an insurmountable obstacle in the path of Guderian's tanks. The enemy not only was slowed sharply, but was even halted from its sudden strong attacks. For two weeks he tried to penetrate corps defenses on the line of the Zusha River at Mtsensk, but all attempts failed. And it was only when the corps withdrew to a new line to the east together with other troops of the Bryansk Front on 26 October by order of the VGH [Supreme High Command] Headquarters that the Hitlerites were able to continue the offensive on Tula.

Reinhardt, (Frisner) and others see the reason for failure of the operation to capture Moscow to lie in Germany's insufficient preparation for war and in the operational-strategic and political mistakes by leaders of the Third Reich.¹⁶ The authors try to convince the reader that having adopted the blitzkrieg strategy, Hitler consciously rejected the General Staff's demands for a more "thorough" military-economic preparation of the country for war and refused to create a developed war industry and direct its capacities for military purposes. This led to a reduction in the scope of fascist Germany's military preparations. Therefore, assert the falsifiers, as early as late October the initial reserves for supporting an operation to capture Moscow had been expended and, deprived of logistical support, troops of Army Group Center were in a catastrophic situation.

A majority of publications by bourgeois historians are permeated with the idea of the Hitlerites' "lost chances." The implication is that in a future war being prepared by present-day revenge-seekers "everything will be different." For example, in the article by D. Palmer entitled "The Eighth Road to Moscow,"¹⁷ it is estimated that Russia has experienced invasion seven times beginning with the Vikings in the 9th century and ending with Hitler in 1941. All campaigns failed because the conquerors moved on Moscow only from one side. Palmer proposes his own plan for aggression in which the main attack must be delivered by China, a second attack from Western Europe and secondary blows from the southern flank. The United States provides intelligence from artificial earth satellites and nuclear missile support over the North Pole. The invasion from Western Europe probably will be headed up by Germany, whose offensive will divert considerable forces and the attention of Moscow without fail. Numerous other scenarios of a future war against the USSR and countries of the socialist community are being published in the United States.

Thus the lie, deceit and juggling being used widely by bourgeois historiography in covering events of World War II in general and the Battle of Moscow in particular pursue concrete goals: to undermine the Soviet Union's authority, to rehabilitate imperialism's politics in the war years, to justify the predatory plans of today's U.S. ruling circles, to substantiate ideologically the imperialists' preparation for a new world war and so on.

But those who love military adventures must remember the indestructible defense of the Land of Soviets and the resolve of our people and their Armed Forces to defend the Great October's achievements against any aggressor. To speak with the Soviet Union from a "position of strength" is a hopeless matter. This was stated precisely and clearly in the CPSU CC Accountability Report to the 26th party congress, and lessons of the defeat of fascist hordes in the Battle of Moscow remind us of this.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Reinhardt, "Povorot pod Moskvoy," translated from the German, Voenizdat, 1980, p 381.
2. A. Yakushevskiy, "The Battle of Moscow and Bourgeois Falsifiers of History" (See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1971, pp 92-100).
3. H. Baldwin, "Battles Lost and Won: Great Campaigns of World War II," New York, 1966.
4. B. Liddel Hart, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna" [World War II], translated from the English, Voenizdat, 1976, p 161.
5. H. Baldwin, "The Crucial Years," New York, 1976, p 320.
6. K. Reinhardt, "Die Wende vor Moskau. Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42" [The Turning Point at Moscow: The Failure of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941-1942], Stuttgart, 1973, p 296.

7. H. Maule, "The Great Battles of World War II," London, 1975.
8. "Decisive Battles of the 20th Century: Land, Sea, and Air," edited by N. Frankland and C. Dowling, London, 1976.
9. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945" [The History of World War II: 1939-1945], Vol 4, p 92; Vol 6, 1976, pp 213, 257; Liddel Hart, 492.
10. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 4, p 93; TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], stack 358, list 5931, file 4, sheet 173.
12. See K. Tippelskirch, "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny," translated from the German, Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1956, p 207.
13. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 4, pp 284, 307.
14. E. Ziemke, "Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East," Washington, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1968, pp 14, 32.
15. Ibid., p 14.
16. Reinhardt, pp 113, 134, 154; (G. Frisner), "Proigrannyye srazheniya" [Lost Battles], translated from the German, Voenizdat, 1966, pp 211-213.
17. ARMOR. THE MAGAZINE OF MOBILE WARFARE, Vol LXXVIII, No 6, November-December, 1969, pp 50-53.

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MOBILIZATION OF GROUND FORCES IN WORLD WAR II DESCRIBED

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[Article, published under the heading "World War II," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col A. Khar'kov: "From the Experience of Ground Forces Mobilization"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The increase in the spatial scope, duration and dynamic nature of armed warfare, the increase in the number of states participating in it as well as the appearance of mass armies in the late 18th century and early 19th century made it necessary for countries of the opposing sides to conduct general mobilizations aimed at implementing a set of measures to place armed forces on a wartime footing and reorganize the economy and state institutions for supporting war needs.

During a mobilization there was an increase in the size of armies and navies of states preparing for war or participating in war (a total of some 70 million persons were mobilized in World War I and over 110 million in World War II) and new formations were set up as envisaged by the mobilization plans. The end goal of all these measures reduced to achieving the necessary fighting complement of army and navy forces prepared to accomplish combat missions under any conditions of the military situation.¹

The purpose of this article is to examine the features of ground forces mobilization in World War II based on the experience of the Soviet Army and armies of certain capitalist states, and show the most important trends and problems which have not lost significance under present-day conditions.

/Fundamentals of mobilization/

/The essence of mobilization in the Soviet Armed Forces/, according to prewar views, consisted of the "planned and timely transition of every individual military unit, staff, directorate, establishment and the entire Red Army from the peacetime T/O&E to a wartime T/O&E."² To this end, for example, rifle divisions were required to bring up additional personnel, means of transportation and certain kinds of weapons from the reserve and bring their T/O&E up to that indicated in Table 1, as well as to deploy a number of new units and combined units.

Table 1

| Forces and Means | Peacetime T/O&E | | Wartime T/O&E |
|--------------------|-----------------|-------|---------------|
| Personnel | 12,000 | 6,000 | 14,483 |
| Vehicles | 414 | 155 | 558 |
| Horses | 1,955 | 905 | 3,039 |
| Weapons: | | | |
| Rifles | 7,818 | 3,658 | 10,420 |
| Submachineguns | 1,159 | 691 | 1,204 |
| Medium machineguns | 164 | 163 | 166 |
| Light machineguns | 371 | 324 | 392 |

It should be noted that the majority of divisions in border military districts had a T/O&E of 12,000 persons. These combined units were supposed to shift to wartime T/O&E in a short period of time. The combat effectiveness of the ground forces was degraded, however, by the fact that the industry did not have time to satisfy their needs for weapons, transportation, communications equipment and so on.

Mobilization was divided into two types based on the scope of activities to be conducted: general mobilization, when it concerned all the Armed Forces and was accomplished throughout the country's territory; and partial mobilization, when it took place in one or several military districts.

Planning of the mobilization deployment of the ground forces originated with the Armed Forces mobilization plan and was accomplished in accordance with requirements for mobilization work in troop units, directorates and establishments of the Red Army. It consisted of elaborating all mobilization activities in peacetime which precisely defined the sequence, time periods and comprehensive support of mobilization.

A 2-6 hour period for moving to assembly areas was set for rifle divisions which made up the first echelon of armies covering the border military districts. It was easier to make combined units and units of individual combat arms and branches of the Armed Forces combat ready inasmuch as they were maintained based on T/O&E's near those of wartime.³

The technical reorganization of the Soviet Army and significant troop movement in western parts of Belorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia and the Baltic led to a need to draw up a new plan, which was approved in February 1941. The districts were to make additions and clarifications to their own plans prior to 1 May of that same year.

Supporting the mobilization needs of troops with vehicles and tractors presented the greatest difficulty. It was planned to solve this problem by the receipt of motor transportation from the national economy, internal military districts and industry.⁴

Instructions of the Communist Party Central Committee to the effect that the Soviet people had to be in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of military invasion played a major role in mobilization work.

The military council of a military district was responsible for the district's mobilization readiness. The chief of staff was the immediate director of all mobilization work.

Mobilization was declared by a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase, and the mobilization call-up and subsequent wartime call-ups were conducted on the basis of a decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and by orders of the People's Commissar of Defense.

Troops were notified of a mobilization by instructions of the district commander, and reservists were notified through the military commissariats by personal notices or mobilization orders.

The experience of drawing up mobilization plans and subsequent practical activities of deploying the troops indicated that a reduction in time periods for mobilization deployment as well as efficiency permitting a prompt reaction to possible changes in the situation were of greatest importance in planning with the beginning of war and in its course.

/The basis for mobilization of fascist Germany's armed forces/ contained ideas of aggression, an initial powerful surprise attack and conduct of a blitzkrieg, which led to advance mobilization deployment of the ground forces with a considerable increase in size of formations and combined units (Table 2).

Deployment of wartime armed forces was accomplished on the basis of the 1939-1940 mobilization plan, which envisaged: accelerated mobilization deployment immediately before the war; the conduct of a general or partial mobilization without an official declaration of war (version "X"), the possibility of accomplishing a mobilization with an official declaration of war (version "Mob"); a doubling of the number of divisions and call-up of mobilization resources for deploying an army numbering 3.24 million men.⁷

An acceleration in mobilization periods was supported by the fact that combined units in border areas were kept constantly at the T/O&E's near those of wartime. Mobilization of infantry divisions in the depth of the country had to be accomplished by four successive waves: for combined units of the first wave by 1200 hours of the second day (for newly activated units by 1200 hours of the third day) of mobilization, and for divisions of the second, third and fourth waves, by 2000 hours of the sixth day.

/Mobilization deployment of Japan's troops/ had the very same aggressive military-political calculations, but it was conducted gradually and more stealthily.

/A substantial difference of mobilization deployment of ground forces in England and the United States/ from that of other countries was that they planned to begin it only after entry into the war, taking advantage of their geographical positions.

Table 2*

| Combined Units | 1937-1938 | | 1939-1940 | |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| | Peacetime | Wartime | Peacetime | Wartime |
| Infantry divisions | 32 | 61 | 35 | 86 |
| Mountain rifle divisions | -- | -- | 3 | 3 |
| Motorized divisions | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Light infantry divisions | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 |
| Tank divisions | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| Cavalry brigades | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total: | 41 | 70 | 52 | 103 |

*B. Mueller-Hillebrand, "Sukhoputnaya armiia Germanii 1933-1945 gg." [Germany's Ground Army: 1933-1945], Vol 1, Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1956, pp 73, 81, 166-178, 180-183.

Mobilizations could be conducted stealthily, where it was not made common knowledge, or openly.

/The Course of Mobilization/

The imminent military threat from the imperialist states required the Communist Party and Soviet government to take decisive steps to increase combat and mobilization readiness. To this end there was a transition to a cadre system of troop manning and organization, finally fixed by the Law on Universal Military Obligation adopted 1 September 1939 at the extraordinary 4th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In order to increase militarily trained reserve contingents, under the new law the draft age was lowered from 21 to 19, and to 18 for those who had finished a complete secondary school.⁸

The periods of active duty for the rank-and-file and junior command personnel of the ground forces were increased to three years, and their time in the reserve was increased to ten years. It was planned to increase considerably the time periods for reservist training courses: 1½ years for the rank-and-file, 2 years for junior commanders, and 3 years for officers for all the time they were in the reserve. The law which was adopted permitted a considerable increase in size of the Armed Forces in short time periods and the preparation of large personnel reserves. There was a reorganization of military commissariats and an improvement in their qualitative make-up and training on the basis of this law. Military departments of party committees of rayons, cities and oblasts formed by resolution of the 18th party congress played a large part here. They directed the work of defense organizations and mobilized party and Komsomol members and all toilers for mastery of military affairs.

Deployment of the Armed Forces was reflected above all in the increase in their personnel strength. For example, by September 1941 the overall size of

the Army and Navy was 2.8 times greater than in 1939. In May and early June 1941 some 800,000 persons were called up from the reserve.¹²

The increase in overall size had a beneficial effect on an improvement in the combat and mobilization readiness of the ground forces. This was reflected practically in the formation of new rifle divisions and the gradual transition of units and combined units to wartime T/O&E's. By mid-1941 the Ground Forces had 303 rifle, tank, motorized and cavalry divisions, of which 81 were in the activation stage.¹³

Local military control entities played a large part in accomplishing the tasks for conducting mobilization in an organized manner. Relying on the constant help of party and soviet entities and public organizations, military commissariats successfully held regular call-ups in 1939 and 1940 and two call-ups in 1941, and they performed all tasks of allocation and use of human resources prescribed by the mobilization plan. The troops received good replacements, but fascist Germany's treacherous surprise attack on our country hindered the successful conclusion of the planned activities. Soviet troops were not able to complete the tactical teamwork training of units to the full extent by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and were forced to enter battle with a shortage in combat equipment, weapons and transportation, with rear services entities not fully deployed and with insufficiently trained combined units and units.

A state of martial law was introduced on the territory of the western district on the very first day of the war by ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and mobilization of reservists born in 1905-1918 began on the following day. Mobilization contingents of the western oblasts were sent from assembly points, according to plans, to the locations of military units, which often proved to be abandoned. For this reason a significant number of draftees did not reach those units for which they were destined. The plan for movements of personnel and mechanized transportation on centralized orders from other military districts also was disrupted. As a result troops of the Baltic, Western and Kiev Special military districts turned out to be short in personnel, vehicles and tractors.

Mobilization of troops in the Leningrad and Odessa districts, which took place without substantial hindrance on the enemy's part, was accomplished in conformity with the plan. By 1 July, i.e., during the first eight days of the war, a total of 5.3 million persons in the country had been called up for mobilization.¹⁵

During the mobilization of reservists military formations were set up in every republic, oblast and kray. From 22 June through 1 December 1941 291 divisions and 94 brigades were sent to the army in the field.¹⁶

Party mobilizations announced by the VKP(b) [All Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] CC played a large part in reinforcing troop combat effectiveness. In just the first half-year of war the party sent over 1.1 million party members into the ranks of the Armed Forces. The steps taken by the VKP(b) CC and the Soviet government played an enormous role in reorganizing

the country's entire life on a wartime footing and in creating necessary conditions for the successful conduct of the war.

In order to fill out the army in the field with trained personnel, the State Defense Committee adopted a decree on 16 July 1941 about the training of reserves, and on 17 September it adopted the decree "On Universal Compulsory Training of USSR Citizens in Military Affairs." The activation of reserve units and combined units from trained contingents took place in the internal military districts. This work was headed up by the Main Directorate of Activation and Manning of Red Army Troops set up under the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense].

The combat actions which had begun showed that on the whole the prewar organization of units, combined units and formations met the demands of the future war and features of the theater of military operations. A Soviet rifle division fully up to strength in personnel, equipment and weapons conceded nothing to the Wehrmacht's infantry division in combat capabilities. But in contrast to the fascist German combined units, which already were conducting combat actions and were being maintained at full strength, the average manning of our rifle divisions before the war was as follows: 11,985 men in the Leningrad, 8,712 in the Baltic Special, 9,327 in the Western Special, 8,792 in the Kiev Special and 8,400 in the Odessa military districts.¹⁸

/The increase in strength of Germany's ground forces/ began back in 1926, with the elaboration of so-called plan "A," under which it was planned to increase the number of divisions from 7 to 21 by the summer of 1934. They already numbered 41 divisions by the fall of 1936.¹⁹

The accomplishment of mobilization measures in secrecy was stepped up by Hitler's leaders beginning in the spring of 1939. For example, in May of that year six army headquarters, 11 army corps headquarters and 24 divisions had been made combat ready, and their activation continued in subsequent months as well. This permitted fascist Germany to create an invasion army of 22 infantry, 6 panzer, 4 motorized and 4 light infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade even before the beginning of general mobilization, which corresponded to 35 percent of the strength of wartime ground forces, 85 percent of panzer divisions and 100 percent of motorized and light infantry divisions; and 63 percent of the forces earmarked for combat actions in the east, i.e., almost 2/3 of forces being deployed.²⁰ The tempo and scope of mobilization activities rose after Germany's fascist leadership made the decision to attack Poland. These activities were conducted in accordance with the directive "On Unified Preparation of Armed Forces for 1939-1940" dated 3 April 1939.

As a result of the general secret mobilization, fascist Germany's ground forces numbered over 2.7 million men by 1 September 1939, and the reserve army numbered some one million persons.²¹

In preparing for aggression against the Soviet Union Hitler's leadership conducted additional measures for the Wehrmacht's mobilization deployment. There were 4 new field army headquarters, 4 panzer group headquarters, 16 corps

headquarters, 58 divisions, as well as 11 separate battalions and 2 batteries of self-propelled artillery mounts and 14 motorized antitank battalions activated in the ground forces.²²

/Japan also conducted a gradual deployment of ground forces/ on the basis of the 1937 mobilization plan, which envisaged an increase in the number of divisions from 24 to 51 by 1941.²³ Ten infantry divisions were mobilized and new combined units were activated in 1938. By the summer of 1939 the total strength of Japanese troops in Manchuria reached 350,000 persons with 1,052 guns, 385 tanks and 355 aircraft in the order of battle; and in Korea there were 60,000 Japanese officers and men, 264 guns, 34 tanks and 20 aircraft.

During the period 1937-1939 the number of divisions in Japan rose from 30 to 41. While its ground forces numbered 1.24 million persons at the end of March 1939,²⁵ by the end of 1941 their total strength reached 2.1 million.²⁶

/France began premobilization activities a month before the beginning of World War II./ By late August 1939 the size of its armed forces rose to 2,674,000 men after a number of special call-ups were made. The ground forces had 108 divisions,²⁷ and by April 1940 they already had 113 mobilized divisions.²⁸

/The United States and England/ did not maintain major ground armies in peacetime, devoting primary attention to enlarging naval forces and keeping them combat ready. It was planned to begin mobilization deployment of ground forces and to create a mass army after the beginning of a war and complete this during the first and even the second year. For example, England planned to create 20 divisions in the first year and 55 divisions by the end of the second year.²⁹

The strength of the U.S. ground forces rose somewhat faster. In December 1936 a directive of the American Army Chief of Staff announced the beginning of development of a "Mobilization Plan for Covering Forces." It contemplated deployment of 730,000 well equipped ground forces within 90 days from the day mobilization was announced. Later the size of the Army was to exceed one million persons in a short period of time.³⁰

Experience showed on the whole that successful accomplishment of mobilization was contingent on a well arranged registration of the draft contingent; the availability and preparation of human resources for manning the military formations being deployed; the organized notification and assembly of reservists as well as mobilization of means of transportation; and the peacetime stockpiling of necessary stores of weapons, military equipment and other supplies.

Despite the uniqueness of mobilization systems adopted by the states participating in World War II and the direction of activities to increase the combat readiness of army and navy forces in prewar times, the following trends appeared in accomplishment of these measures:

1. There was clearly an attempt made by aggressive ruling circles of fascist Germany and imperialist Japan for advance mobilization of army and navy forces and for their strategic deployment to deliver an initial powerful surprise attack on the enemy. This permitted them to create a correlation of forces in their favor and achieve certain successes, albeit temporary ones.

2. World War II revealed the increased tie between the conduct of armed forces mobilization and transition of the state as a whole to a wartime footing. Under conditions of a sudden beginning of the war and a difficult situation, military missions could be accomplished successfully only with advance comprehensive preparation not only of the ground forces, but also of all sectors of the national economy on the basis of a planned transition to a wartime footing and its timely reorganization for satisfying the needs of the army and navy.

3. An attempt was seen on the part of a number of states to accomplish a planned build-up in troop strength in the interests of concealing mobilization in the prewar years under the guise of a call-up of reservists for training courses and maneuvers. An important role was played here by the territorial principle of manning, which permitted reducing to a minimum the mobilization movements of personnel and supplies and creation of mobilization stores near troop activation points. A precisely arranged system of notification, timely delivery of equipment to unit activation locations, comprehensive support and continuous control contributed to a reduction in the time periods for deploying forces and means.

4. A tendency was seen on the part of the fascist German and Japanese military-political leadership to use local wars and military provocations for building up their military potential by conducting partial mobilizations. The importance of a detailed study of this practice rises especially in connection with the fact that under the pretext of the imaginary "Soviet threat" "even now the North Atlantic Alliance possesses enormous military might. Its chief grouping--over 80 percent of the divisions and half of all tactical aviation--is stationed within the European Theater of Military Operations."³¹

It can be noted in conclusion that the mobilization of ground troops and preparation of personnel for combat actions in the past war were a complex process of quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of troop groupings. The extent to which mobilization capabilities were implemented depended largely on concrete conditions of the military-political and strategic situation. Despite certain differences (which were at times considerable), it was achieved by conducting general and partial mobilizations and by the open or secret method. The accomplishment of secret mobilization permitted avoiding disruptions in the planned nature of its conduct to a greater extent, made it possible to anticipate the enemy in deployment, and ensured higher troop combat readiness.

Under present-day conditions states of the aggressive NATO bloc are conducting constant preparations for mobilization. For example, despite the presence of a large Armed Forces, the United States is building up militarily trained contingents in peacetime which are being prepared not only within the

ranks of the regular Army and Navy, but also as part of the National Guard and in reserves of branches of the Armed Forces. The presence of nuclear weapons and other very new means of destruction in armies of the United States and NATO countries in addition to this does not allow us to count on some kind of preparatory period in which it would be possible to conduct significant measures to reinforce the troops. At the present time, as never before, it is necessary to have the Soviet Armed Forces in constant combat and mobilization readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor in order to check the aggressive aspirations of imperialist states, and the United States above all.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1976, p 511; Vol 5, 1978, p 342.
2. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], stack 40442, list 1, file 1879, sheet 6.
3. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945" [History of World War II: 1939-1945], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1974, p 435.
4. The mobilization plan envisaged the transfer from the national economy to the Armed Forces of 240,000 vehicles and some 43,000 tractors ("Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 3, p 435).
5. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 5, p 341.
6. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 3, p 416.
12. Ibid., p 440.
13. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 2, p 55.
15. Ibid., Vol 5, p 343.
16. Ibid., Vol 2, p 56.
18. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 3, p 419.
19. "Nachal'nyy period voyny" [The Initial Period of the War], Voenizdat, 1974, p 124.
20. Ibid., p 131.
21. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 2, 1974, p 377.
22. Ibid., Vol 3, p 319.

23. Tokushiro Hattori, "Yaponiya v voyne 1941--1945" [Japan in the War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1973, p 86.
25. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 2, p 386.
26. J. B. Cohen, "Voyennaya ekonomika Yaponii" [Japan's Economy in War], Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1951, p 291.
27. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945," Vol 2, p 407.
28. (D.) M. (Proektor), "Voyna v Yevrope 1939--1941 gg." [The War in Europe: 1939-1941], Voenizdat, 1963, p 157.
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AIR OPERATIONS OF U.S. AND ENGLAND IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 24 Mar 82) pp 61-69

[Article, published under the heading "World War II," by Doctor of Historical Sciences Col A. Noskov and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col F. Shesterin: "The Origin and Development of Air Operations by the Air Forces of U.S. and England"*; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] A new form of employment for air forces--the air operation--originated and saw further development during World War II in the process of practical employment of U.S. and British strategic aviation. It represented the coordinated combat actions of one or several aviation formations and combined units carried out independently or in coordination with other branches of the armed forces under a unified concept and plan to attain a strategic or operational objective.

But our former allies did not immediately arrive at this form for employing major forces of strategic aviation. For example, for a long while the operations of British strategic aviation were of a limited nature and ineffective, which gave grounds to qualify them as "terrorizing raids" or "pinpricks."¹

Air actions of the British Air Force which bore certain features of an air operation were conducted for the first time on 15 May 1940. By decision of Churchill's war cabinet aviation of the British expeditionary forces consisting of 99 bombers delivered a night attack against oil refineries and rail installations in the Ruhr. This date usually is considered the beginning of the strategic aviation offensive against fascist Germany.

Further air operations against oil refineries planned by the air staff were postponed on Churchill's order. On 2 September 1940 the air staff submitted a plan to the British government which envisaged Germany's defeat in a six-month period with the help of bomber forces brought up to 4,000 aircraft. As part of this plan a directive was issued on 30 October 1940 with the idea of "area bombing"² as its basis.

*The article examines air operations of the U.S. and British air forces conducted against fascist Germany.

The United States entered the war in December 1941. Instead of joining efforts of the air forces for the purpose of destroying fascist Germany's oil refining industry, which was one of the most vulnerable links in its economy, reducing the production of fuel and thus making it easier to win air superiority not only in Western Europe, but also at the Soviet-German front, a directive came out on 14 February 1942 which defined the undermining of the morale of the enemy's civilian population, and especially the workers, as the chief objective of strategic bombing.

From the standpoint of organizing the bombings, it must be noted that objectives, missions, forces to be used, operating methods, the combination of night and day strikes, and precise time frame for implementing the outlined plan--all this confirmed the presence of more complete components of the air operation. Beginning in 1943 the air operation received its final recognition as a form of employment of strategic aviation of the U.S. and British air forces.

/Planning and preparation of air operations./ Beginning in 1943 the careful planning and preparation of air operations was typical in employment of the Anglo-American air forces. For example, according to the plan for the allied joint strategic air offensive within the framework of Operation "Pointblank," the air combat actions analysis and planning group of the joint Anglo-American chiefs of staff committee proposed putting all targets together into six groups of objectives for the purpose of winning air supremacy in the western TVD [theater of military operations] and weakening the German economy: yards for building submarines and submarine bases; the aviation industry; ball bearing plants; plants for refining oil and producing synthetic fuels; enterprises for the production of synthetic rubber; and transportation. For political and economic reasons it was not planned to subject a number of the most important sectors of industry to pressure from the U.S. and British air forces.

In the planning of air operations an objective, missions, scope and duration were outlined for each of them. These parameters were not identical and varied within considerable limits. Consideration also was given to the nature of the targets, possibilities of reconstructing them, and opposition by air defense weapons. Missions were determined, the forces and time needed for their accomplishment were calculated and the number of strikes to be delivered were calculated depending on the objectives.

The general fundamental agreement reached on dividing air actions by time of day (at night for the British and during the day for the American air forces) had a definite influence on the nature and specific features of planning and preparing aviation of the allied powers for combat actions.

The operations staff of the British Air Force bomber command worked on the immediate planning of an air operation by British strategic aviation. Its functions included developing flight routes to and from the objective; establishing flight altitudes and intervals for the aircraft; creation of groups for guidance to the targets of the upcoming attack, determination of the sequence of actions, marking the primary check points and objectives with

illuminating bombs as well as the composition of diversionary and demonstration groups. The final phase of planning was compilation of a time table for the target approach by support groups of various types and the main body of bombers participating in the operation.

All data would come to the combined units and units of strategic aviation in the form of operational warning orders, and here specific preparations would be made on their basis. The preparations consisted of successive phases. For example, in the first phase primary attention was given to thorough preparation of flag specialists. The second phase was characterized by detailed training of crew members in their specialization. The third phase consisted of an assembly for all participants of a given operation in the process of which they received necessary information about the air situation along the route and in the vicinity of the target of operations, the enemy's air defense system, weather conditions, and data on communications including procedures for its use. The crews' actions were run through down to the most minor details on maintaining a given flight altitude, on maintaining time and intervals along the route, on passing check points, and carrying out bombing against the targets.

At the times established for each crew under the schedule the bombers' take-off would begin with an interval of from 1 to 4 minutes. Using preliminary computation data and strictly maintaining time, altitude and intervals, the aircraft, taking off simultaneously from many airfields, gradually would form into columns of bombers above a specific, partially visible check reference point. On the approach to the target each crew would perform missions on its own.

A number of provisions involved with planning and preparing British Air Force strategic aviation's air operations also were applied in the work of the American command, but operations under daytime conditions required additional measures to be taken. In particular, enormously more attention was given to methods of combating enemy air defense, organizing coordination between the bombers and escorting fighters, and increasing the reliability of air navigation and accuracy of hitting attack objectives, which in the final account ensured higher effectiveness of the operations carried out. The preceding combat actions of units and combined units were given a thorough analysis, changes in the system of enemy air defense and its weak and strong points were considered, the safer routes and directions of approaches to the target were selected, and new tactics and methods of accomplishing assigned missions were used. Greater attention also was given to improving radio navigation systems and jamming enemy radiotechnical equipment. There was thorough development of methods for screening friendly bombers, demonstration actions, evasive action, and a search for combat formations of air groups that had greater defensive capability. Practice of the aforementioned elements made up the primary content of preparation by units and combined units for conducting an air operation.

Inasmuch as German air defense fighter aviation was offering strong opposition to allied bombers, the Anglo-American command began to provide in advance and plan air battles and engagements for combating it, and these were an inalienable part of the air operations.

Use of the experience gained, systematic collection and generalization of reconnaissance results, and debriefing of crews after combat sorties permitted the U.S. and British air force leadership to draw certain conclusions, make corrections to the planning and preparation of the next air operations, and avoid stereotypes in combat actions.

For example, in studying the status of enemy air defense it was established that the capabilities of each radar were limited. It was able to guide fighters only to one air target in 10 minutes, while a battery of heavy AAA could conduct aimed fire only against a single bomber. Based on these data, the American command employed a new alignment of combat formations in air operations. The air wing was broken into three groups of 18 aircraft each. Instead of the previous horizontal alignment, each group and wing as a whole now had a combat formation disposed vertically. The first (lead) group was in the center, the second above it, and the third below it. This wing alignment was called a "box." Behind the first "box" at a distance of six miles came the second, then the third and so on. The advantage of the new tactic was that in a short time the enemy air defense zone was crossed by a maximum number of bombers with which neither fighters nor AAA could cope simultaneously. Such a combat formation also permitted increasing its defensive capability in repulsing mass fighter attacks. All this was worked out in the period of preparing the air operation.

The leadership of the U.S. and British air forces gave much attention to organizing reconnaissance (preliminary and immediate).

And so the improvement in planning and preparation of air operations followed the line of identifying the most vulnerable enemy targets; determining the time, forces and means for their destruction (neutralization); a search for more rational combat formations; selection of flight routes, operating methods and methods of neutralizing air defense weapons; organization of the coordination between bombers and escorting fighters, and arranging the personnel's preliminary practice of upcoming combat actions; and organization of aerial reconnaissance.

/Conduct of air operations./ The military command of U.S. and British strategic aviation conducted air operations for different /objectives/: for example, winning air supremacy, the destruction of industrial enterprises manufacturing war products, undermining the morale of the civilian populace, destruction of submarine bases on the Atlantic coast of France, support to ground forces combat actions and so on.

Based on their /missions/ and the number of participating bombers, air operations had a strategic or operational scope. For example, Operation "Pointblank" conducted by Anglo-American aviation in Europe (June 1943-April 1944) and pursuing the goal of winning air supremacy in the western TVD, was of strategic importance. Air operation "Gomorra" for the destruction of Hamburg (24 July-3 August 1943) had an operational nature. Several allied air formations participated in operation "Pointblank," and only one, a British formation, took part in operation "Gomorra." At times the air operation represented an aggregate of several operations of an operational scale. They

lasted from 1-2 days (the operation to destroy the V-1 and V-2 launch pads, "Thunderbolt," "Clarion" and others) to several months ("Pointblank").³

At the beginning of the war strategic bombers would deliver /concentrated strikes/ with individual subunits and units in conducting air operations. Later air operations began to be accomplished as /a single massed attack,/ primarily against cities, with forces of up to 1,000 or more bombers (the attack on Cologne on 30 May, against Essen on 4 June, against Berlin on 26 June and so on).

The next stage in improving air operations is the /series of massed attacks/ by major forces of the British and U.S. air forces with a clear-cut goal, such as destruction of submarine bases on the Atlantic coast of France (Brest, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire and La Pallice) in January-February 1943. For 1½ months British bombers flew some 2,000 sorties alone for attacks against the submarine base at Lorient. Three massive night attacks were made against the base at Saint-Nazaire, in one of which 400 bombers took part simultaneously.

The U.S. Air Force command tried using /low-altitude bombing of targets./ For example, an air operation was conducted in August 1943 for the purpose of knocking out the Ploesti oil refineries. The 177 aircraft approached the target by contour flying. But low-altitude bombing had not been mastered sufficiently by the crews and the bombers themselves were impractical for such actions. There were heavy losses as a result, 53 bombers shot down, 55 seriously damaged, and 440 crew members dead or missing.⁴ The groundlessness of calculations as to the capability of American heavy bombers to conduct an independent successful fight against enemy fighters became obvious. But the American crews were not able to shift to night bombings since they had no skills in night flying and their retraining would require a lengthy time.

The crisis situation was overcome with the arrival of the modified "Mustang" and "Lightning" fighters in early 1944, which could be employed for long-range bomber escort.

Accomplishment of the so-called /"shuttle operations"/ (1944) was something new. Strategic aviation of the western allies, especially the United States, obtained the capability of conducting air operations to a great depth by using airfields of England, Italy and the USSR. For example, B-17 bombers escorted by "Mustangs" took off in Italy on 2 June 1944, bombed railway junctions in Hungary and made a landing on Soviet airfields. On the return route these same forces delivered an attack against military-industrial targets in Romania. Similar "shuttle operations" were conducted repeatedly.

Beginning in mid-spring 1944 air operations began to be carried out to support the landing of allied forces in France (Operation "Overlord"). Their development lay in the conduct of an entire /series of air operations/ in the interests of ground forces. Initially attacks would be made against airfields basing aircraft, rail junctions, shore batteries and the radar system, then they screened the assault forces and supported their landing.

In this phase the intensity of bombings (by time and number of aircraft) was combined with the use of additional forces and means. For example, in Operation "Transportation Plan" (that was the designation of the air operation to knock out enemy lines of communication) medium bombers and even fighters were employed in addition to strategic aviation. The main bridges over the Seine between Le Havre and Paris were demolished as a result, which greatly hindered the movement of fascist German forces in Northern France.

Strikes also were delivered against deliberate enemy defenses in air operations conducted in the interests of ground troops. So-called /"saturation bombings"/ were employed here, during which a maximum number of bombs were dropped in a short time period on a small area occupied by the enemy. For example, during one air operation on 25 July 1944 a massive strike was made against a sector of German defenses 6.5 km wide and 250 m deep. The 24,000 bombs dropped not only demolished the defense, but also demoralized the enemy. The American 1st Army received the opportunity of continuing the offensive.^{4a}

An air operation also was conducted during elimination of the Ardennes penetration made by the German 5th and 6th panzer armies and 7th Field Army in the latter half of December 1944. The objective of the air operation, which lasted almost a month (from 24 December 1944 through 22 January 1945) was disruption of supplies to enemy forces. The allies used some 5,000 tactical and strategic aircraft, the efforts of which disorganized lines of communication being used by the enemy.⁵ There were strikes against friendly troops in carrying out air operations in the interests of the ground forces. Arrangement of coordination between strategic aviation and ground forces on the battlefield proved to be such a difficult matter that the American and British air forces were not able to arrange it before the end of the war.

Along with conducting the aforementioned air operations, the allies also carried out senseless, barbaric bombings of cities.

Having built up forces by the summer of 1944, the allied command sharply increased the /intensity and scope of air operations./ For example, while the American 8th Air Force, stationed on the British Isles, used only 25 days of the last five months of 1943 for conducting air operations and 95 days for all of 1943, it used 253 days during 1944.⁶

In shifting to the delivery of mass strikes, the U.S. and British air forces began to employ up to 1,000-2,000 aircraft within the framework of air operations. Even greater forces were used in May 1944 during Operation "Clarion," conducted for the purpose of supporting the landing of allied troops: up to 10,000 American and British aircraft based at airfields of England, France, Holland, Belgium and Italy.⁷

/Various techniques and methods of supporting air operations were used during the operations./ We will give several examples.

In conducting an air operation to knock out industrial enterprises of Cologne on 30 May 1942 50 aircraft of the British Air Force /denied the use of enemy airfields/ in Western Germany, France, Belgium and Holland.

In Operation "Taxable" the /choice of route/ for the aircraft was determined so as to create the impression that they were flying in the direction of a certain target, but at the very last moment the aircraft suddenly changed course and proceeded to their actual objective. This maneuver would confuse the operators of the German fighter control and guidance posts.

/Demonstration groups/ would be assigned quite often in accomplishing air operations. They would deliver a diversionary strike against a secondary target while the main forces closed with the primary objective. That was the case in conducting Operation "Thunderbolt" (1944). Allied bombers took off from British airfields at 1800 hours on 13 February to deliver the first strike. Over 300 aircraft took off together with them, with the mission of beginning a raid on an oil refinery at Boehlen at 2200 hours and thus divert air defense means to themselves. During the overflight by the main body of aircraft above the Rhein, groups of light night bombers simulated strikes against Dortmund and Bonn.

Aircraft crews observed total radio silence above the territory of Central Germany. It was broken at 2200 hours only by a guidance aircraft, which passed a command to pathfinder aircraft to drop illuminating flares. The main forces began bombing Dresden at 2213 hours, and this lasted 16 minutes. During the second raid on Dresden, which began at 0130 hours 14 February, a group of electronic countermeasures aircraft was in the bomber formation to jam the German radar. The third strike on Dresden, in which 316 B-17 bombers took part, was delivered during the day at 1212 hours. The steps taken during Operation "Thunderbolt" to lead the enemy astray under conditions of fascist Germany's general weakening assured almost unpunished actions by Anglo-American bombers against Dresden. British losses were minimal: six aircraft did not return to base.⁸ The raid on Dresden had the purpose not so much of breaking enemy resistance as of demonstrating to the entire world the military might of the United States and England, making an impression on the Soviet Union and thus preparing the soil for conducting power politics. As a result one of Europe's most ancient cultural and historical centers was demolished barbarically and tens of thousands of residents were annihilated.

The allies were constantly seeking effective methods for supporting air operations, a timely approach to the target and accurate bombing. For example, the British Air Force began to use special /marker bombs/ at night under conditions of dense clouds. During a raid on Berlin on 16 February 1944 the point of aim above the clouds was marked by red and green illuminating parachute flares. The point of aim on the ground was denoted with the help of green target designation bombs which would be dropped periodically throughout the raid by crews of specially assigned small groups of "Lancaster" and "Halifax" bombers. An /aircraft radio navigation system and panoramic automatic radar sight/, which increased bombing accuracy, also were employed. /Measures of antiradar camouflage and active countermeasures/ were accomplished simultaneously for creating interference in vectoring enemy fighters to the target and reducing the effectiveness of antiaircraft fire. The aircraft would drop numerous foil strips, which paralyzed radar operation for a time.

The introduction of new combat formations, diversity in operating methods and various support measures, and outfitting with new combat equipment initially led to considerable results. For example, on 18 March 1943 the American Air Force conducted an air operation to destroy the yards at Vegesack near Bremen, intended for construction of submarines. There were 97 B-17 and B-24 bombers which took part. Despite being attacked by 56 German fighters, the bombers conducted pinpoint bombing, losing only two aircraft.⁹

It should be emphasized that a large number of circumstances made it easier for the Anglo-American air forces to prepare and conduct the air operations.

/First of all,/ allied supremacy in the air was overwhelming. Beginning with the summer of 1944 Germany's air defense system became weaker and weaker with each month, since the fascist leadership was attempting to reinforce the eastern front at the expense of this combat arm as well, in order to slow up if possible the swift advance of the Soviet Army. /Secondly,/ a second front was absent in Western Europe until the summer of 1944. This allowed the United States and England to allocate considerable resources and concentrate efforts to accomplish a large number of air operations, taking advantage of the fact that the main portion of the fascist German Luftwaffe was operating at the Soviet-German front. /Thirdly,/ the basing of strategic aviation was compact--the main mass of bombers was based at 47 airfields north of London in a zone 300 km wide and 100 km deep, which considerably facilitated the process of controlling them. /Fourthly,/ preparation of the operations was conducted in the absence of enemy air attacks against airfields.¹³ /Fifthly,/ strategic aviation of the United States and England was not experiencing substantial difficulties in logistical support or manning. /Sixthly,/ objectives of the bombing were located within a relatively short distance, which permitted accomplishing an extensive maneuver of routes.

It should be admitted that some allied air operations were very effective (to knock out enterprises producing synthetic fuel and to disorganize the transportation network on the territory of France, Belgium, Holland and Western Germany). This was achieved thanks to the winning of air supremacy (from the summer of 1944), employment of a large number of long-range fighter escorts, accomplishment of simultaneous mass attacks, and an increase in bombing accuracy. This was facilitated to a great extent by the serious defeat of Hitler's aviation at the Soviet-German front, which led to a sharp weakening of Germany's air defense capabilities.

On the whole, however, despite the employment of large forces, air operations of the Anglo-American air forces did not deprive Germany of the capability of conducting armed struggle in the main TVD's. The low effect on undermining of its military-economic potential was explained by the following reasons.

/Firstly,/ in delaying the opening of a second front, the command element of the western allies did not step up the intensity of strategic bombings of Germany (only 28 percent of the bomb tonnage had been dropped before June 1944¹⁴), i.e., the activeness and results of operations by the U.S. and British air forces rose only after the Wehrmacht's crushing defeats at the Soviet-German front and the fundamental turning point in the course of all of World War II.

/Secondly,/ instead of concentrating efforts on the most important objectives (for example, against fuel production plants), the allied command allowed the dissipation of forces and means (area bombings of cities), which reduced the effectiveness of the air operations. The terrorizing bombings of cities, on which the allies, especially the British, spent enormous efforts, "did not have a decisive effect on the Germans' capability to manufacture war products,"¹⁵ according to the Americans' admission.

/Thirdly,/ in pursuing certain political goals, the British and U.S. military-political leadership subjected targets producing combat equipment for the ground forces--the shock force of the Reich's war machine--to only sporadic bombings (only 8.9 percent of the bombs were dropped on these targets).

/Fourthly,/ hopes that the "Flying Fortresses" would be capable of penetrating the enemy air defense system on their own without long-range fighter escort and hitting targets in the deep rear were not borne out. Therefore until the summer of 1944 the allied command was not able to win air supremacy and successfully deliver strikes against the most important of Germany's military-economic centers, despite the numerical superiority of its aviation over German aviation.

/Fifthly,/ there was no precise or systematic coordination between the British and American air forces. Each of the sides conducted a majority of the air operations independently, which also had a negative effect on results of the actions.

And so a new form for employment of U.S. and British strategic aviation originated and saw further development during World War II--the air operation, which fully proved itself. Air operations were not identical in their goals, missions, scope, forces employed, time frame, support measures and methods of combat actions. The /trends/ consisted of thorough planning and preparation of combat actions, an increase in their scope, use of major air forces, and the conduct of strategic operations each of which included several operations of an operational scale. Experience indicated that successful accomplishment of air operations was possible only with reliable neutralization of air defense weapons, active and varied support measures, the massive use of bombers, and arrangement of close coordination with other branches of the armed forces and air arms.

/On the whole, however, the United States and Britain did not succeed in undermining Germany's capability to resist only with the help of the strategic air forces. Fascist Germany's military-economic might was undermined chiefly by the crushing blows of the Soviet Army./

FOOTNOTES

1. "Mirovaya voyna 1939--1945" [The World War: 1939-1945], Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1957, p 444.

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3. "Sovetskaya Voennoyaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 281.
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- 4a. Glines, p 224.
5. J. F. C. Fuller, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939--1945 gg." [World War II: 1939-1945], translated from the English, Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1956, pp 456, 457.
6. Glines, p 216.
7. Ibid., p 227.
8. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1964, p 38.
9. A. Price, "Battle over the Reich," London, 1973, p 61.
13. The V-bombs did not operate against bases of the U.S. and British air forces.
14. "The Encyclopedia Americana," Vol 29, New York, 1970, p 506.
15. "The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Area Studies Division Report," Washington, 1947, p 23.

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ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY MARKED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 24 Mar 82) pp 70-72

[Article, published under the heading "In Armies of Socialist Countries," by Col A. Nesterov: "Army of the Working People"]

[Text] The Korean People's Army. [KPA] is 50 years old. Its basis was partisan detachments which for a long while waged a difficult and fierce struggle against Japanese invaders for their country's independence. The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia had a great revolutionizing influence on the Korean people's struggle for their freedom.

On 25 April 1932 Korean communists led by Kim Il-sung formed the first armed detachment out of foremost workers and peasants, which became the nucleus of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. This date now is KPA Day.

An important factor in expanding the anti-Japanese struggle was the formation in May 1936 of the "Society for Rebirth of the Homeland," or the "League for Rebirth of the Motherland." This organization formed partisan support bases and conducted extensive agitprop work among the populace.

The political work of the partisan communists produced its results. Workers, peasants, students and the national intelligentsia conducted strikes, performed subversive activities and took an active part in anti-Japanese demonstrations. Many young people went off to partisan detachments, the size of which constantly grew.

The Soviet Army's victory over imperialist Japan had an enormous effect on the fate of the Korean people. The Korean people's attitude toward the Soviet Army-liberator was reflected most faithfully in the address to the people by the Communist Party committee of the province of South Pyongyang. It stated: "For so many years we were enmeshed in the iron chain of Japanese imperialism and languished under its iron heel. But thanks to the heroic struggle of a great, leading power--the Soviet Union--the Korean people finally received freedom and statehood."¹ But not the entire Korean people gained freedom. As a result of the aggressive politics of imperialism and reactionary circles of Korea, the country was broken into two parts along the 38th parallel.

Guided by Lenin's thesis on the defense of revolutionary achievements, the Korean Workers Party gave much attention to creating revolutionary armed forces for defending the republic. To this end by early 1948 creation of control entities basically had been completed, the majority of units and combined units had been manned, and considerable work had been done in the area of combat and political training with the Soviet Union's assistance.

Formation of the Korean People's Democratic Republic [DPRK] in September 1948 was an event of great historical importance in the country's life. After proclamation of the republic, the Soviet Union completely took its troops out of Korea, thus confirming its peaceloving aspirations in the Far East.

At a time when the working people of North Korea were laying the foundation of a socialist society, the power was seized by the bourgeoisie in South Korea, occupied by American troops. The United States rejected the Soviet Union's proposal about a simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Korea and letting the Korean people themselves decide their fate.

With the direct support of the American military command, South Korean authorities hastily began to form the South Korean Army. The country's territory was transformed into a base of operations for unfolding extensive military preparations for a campaign against the North.

In the interests of defending the freedom and independence of the Korean people, the Workers Party advanced as one of the most important the task of strengthening the armed forces and outfitting them with modern weapons and combat equipment. The Workers Party made wide use of the principles and experience of building the Soviet Army in forming the Korean People's Army--a new type of army.²

Subsequent events confirmed the urgent need and timeliness of measures taken by the party and government to reinforce national defenses.

On 25 June 1950 the South Korean militarists and U.S. ruling circles unleashed war for the purpose of eliminating the DPRK and turning its territory into a base of operations for an attack on the USSR and the PRC.³ The war lasted more than three years. The republic's armed forces, supported by the entire nation, rose up to defend the motherland's freedom and independence. With the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, they not only halted the enemy's advance, but they themselves moved into a resolute counter-offensive.

In an attempt to save the situation, the Pentagon threw large forces into Korea. Troops of countries participating under U.S. bidding and illegally taking cover behind the UN flag participated with American troops against the Korean people.

With a considerable preponderance in weapons and equipment, the interventionists managed to achieve temporary success in some phases of the war, but the enemy's aggressive plans were disrupted thanks to the selfless struggle of the Korean people and timely assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist

countries. From the first days of American aggression the Soviet Union sent a large amount of the latest weapons and military equipment for that time to the Korean people, including aircraft, tanks and artillery; it supplied gear and medicines; and it trained pilots and other specialists.

In November 1950 the government of the People's Republic of China, at that time taking an internationalist position, authorized Chinese people's volunteers to take part in the liberation struggle of the Korean people.⁴

The steadfast defense and unbending will of the KPA's heroic soldiers disrupted the aggressors' plans. After suffering considerable losses in personnel and equipment they gave up further offensive actions.

The American command was forced to sign an armistice agreement on 27 July 1953.

The war against the DPRK ended with the enemy's military and political defeat and showed that under present-day conditions there are powerful political and social forces which possess sufficient means to rebuff any aggressor. The Korean people's victory demonstrated the great force of socialist internationalism. It made a great contribution to defense of peace in the Far East and around the world.

During the three years of war the Korean People's Army became tempered, grew stronger organizationally, and acquired valuable combat experience, on the basis of which its military art developed.

The republic's defensive capability has grown stronger and the People's Army's combat readiness has risen at the present time thanks to the steady growth in the country's economic potential and in the workers' material and cultural level. The constant concern of the Workers Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Kim Il-sung for strengthening national defense is contingent on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The protracted U.S. military presence in South Korea complicates the situation in the Far East and makes it explosive. Major American-South Korean war maneuvers conducted with a large number of ground forces, aviation and naval forces, and the flights of American reconnaissance aircraft in the DPRK's air space contribute to an aggravation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Under conditions of constant threat on the part of imperialist aggressive circles, the DPRK's armed forces are continuously being improved and strengthened and at the present time are capable of defending their motherland's borders against the aggressor's encroachments.

The Soviet people cherish their good relationships with the Korean people. The friendship and cooperation between the USSR and DPRK, founded on principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, meet the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Korean peoples and the interests of ensuring peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world. The foundations of our international ties were fixed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1964.

Soviet citizens take a deeply understanding and sympathetic attitude toward the desire of the Koreans to restore their national unity by peaceful means. "The Soviet Union," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress, "is in unity with the struggle of the DPRK for peaceful democratic unification of the Motherland without external intervention and is striving to deepen and enrich the ties with it."⁵

In celebrating Korean People's Army Day, Soviet military personnel send KPA personnel warm congratulations and wish them further success in strengthening the defensive capability of the DPRK.

FOOTNOTES

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4. Ibid., p 359.
5. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 10.

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MILITARY-HISTORICAL INDOCTRINATION IN THE TRANSBAIKAL MD

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 24 Mar 82) pp 73-78

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Chief of Staff of the Transbaikal MD Col Gen V. Verevkin-Rakhal'skiy: "Military-Historical Work in the Transbaikal Military District"]

[Text] Personnel of the Order of Lenin Transbaikal Military District have to accomplish difficult and diversified missions in fulfilling demands of the Communist Party and Soviet government for increasing the Armed Forces' combat readiness further. In the course of strenuous combat training they are persistently mastering modern weapons and combat equipment and constantly perfecting their field and air schooling. For the successes achieved in combat and political training some district units were awarded honorary and jubilee banners and certificates, and the USSR Minister of Defense Pennant for courage and military valor.

It will be no exaggeration to state that properly arranged and purposefully conducted military historical work contributes to no small extent to the attainment of high indicators in troop and staff training. Its planning is accomplished by the district staff together with the political directorate and it is formalized in the form of an independent section of the annual military-scientific work plan. Of course it reflects only the most important measures such as military historical conferences and military historical field trips, and the development of lectures, briefings and articles on military-historical subjects by various staffs.

Planning on the staffs of combined units and units is accomplished for the training period and so it bears a more detailed character. This concerns in particular questions of military-patriotic indoctrination of the personnel and work among the local populace.

The conduct of military-historical work among different categories of service personnel has specific features. For example its primary purpose for generals and officers is to give maximum assistance in studying the military-theoretical heritage of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU's work to organize defense of the socialist homeland, Great Patriotic War experience and the experience of local wars; and on this basis increasing their level of professional expertise. The most important element in work among other personnel

is to indoctrinate them in a spirit of high combat traditions of our Army and people, of pride for the trust given them for defending their Motherland in the ranks of the glorious Armed Forces, and a hatred for the homeland's enemies. All this has a substantial effect on raising the moral-political status of the troops and their readiness to offer a rebuff immediately to any aggressor.

We use the most diverse forms and methods in military-historical work. The primary form for generals and officers at the management level is independent work on Marxist-Leninist works and military-historical literature. It is also an extensive practice to determine individual assignments for them to draw up briefings, papers, articles and materials for conferences and seminars on military-historical subject matter. The most varied topics are chosen, but we try to tie them in to the maximum with those missions which staffs and the troops must accomplish under operational and combat training plans. In just the last three years, for example, military-historical seminars and conferences have examined the organization of staff work in planning and preparing Great Patriotic War operations in limited time periods; an analysis of operations for encirclement conducted by the Soviet Army at the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939, in the Battle of Stalingrad and in the vicinity of Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy, and the effect of this experience on the further development of Soviet military art; organization of the breakthrough and annihilation of the enemy in fortified areas based on the experience of the East Prussian and Khingan-Mukden operations; features in organizing the tactical employment of artillery in the Battle of Kursk and during night combat actions in eliminating the Zaporozh'ye base of operations in October 1943, and others. This had a positive effect on the quality of command and staff and troop exercises.

In order to keep generals and officers constantly in the picture on the latest achievements of military science and practice, the district regularly conducts military-scientific and technical information briefings. Their plans are drawn up monthly in district directorates and departments and in the staffs of combined units and units. Along with problems of the development of contemporary military art, questions of military history also are covered at these information briefings. Used above all in preparation for them are articles from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL and the journal VOYENNIY VESTNIK, military-historical works, monographs, dissertations and their papers coming in for review, and so on. Officers who present a particular information briefing do not restrict themselves to a simple exposition of material, but strive to analyze it, compare it with previously published works, and determine the possibility of its use in practical activities. Detailed work on primary material and use of additional material, and elaboration of appropriate diagrams enrich the knowledge of the officer himself and increase the students' interest in the matter being presented. The practice of planning and conducting such information briefings allows bringing the maximum number of officers into military-historical work.

We also attach no small importance to a study of the experience of local wars. The critical analysis of combat actions of the troops participating in them, outfitted with contemporary types of conventional weapons, provides an opportunity to identify trends in development and to determine ways of resolving

such matters as, for example, improving the operating tactics of small subunits and the methods of employing combat helicopters and combating them, organization of an antitank defense, overcoming such a defense, and a number of other questions in the tactical employment of units and subunits of the combat arms and special troops. Information briefings are conducted as articles come in on them, and lectures are held in the command training system.

Military-historical and practical science conferences in which the work of the Communist Party and Soviet government to reinforce the defensive capability and protect the Soviet state is revealed comprehensively and in detail are the most important activities in military-historical work. For example, in April 1980 a military-historical conference of the staff and directorates was successfully conducted under the direction of district commander Arm Gen G. I. Salmanov on the topic "World-historic importance of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." Conferees comrades I. M. Dmitriyev, V. V. Kazakov, V. A. Malyuga, K. I. Kobets and others revealed in their presentations the world-historic importance of our victory in the Great Patriotic War, its sources, the decisive contribution by the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the defeat of fascist Germany, the CPSU's leadership role in achieving victory over the enemy, the superiority of Soviet military art, and the influence of the war's experience on employment of branches of the Armed Forces, the combat arms and special troops under present-day conditions.

It should be noted that dozens of such conferences were held in district staffs and the troops just during preparations for celebration of the 35th anniversary of Victory Day.

It has become a good tradition to hold military-historical conferences dedicated to such banner dates as the defeat of the troops of militaristic Japan on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and during the Manchurian Operation in 1945. Troops of the Transbaikal Military District took a direct part in these operations. In August 1979, for example, there was a very successful military-historical conference in connection with the 40th anniversary of the successful completion of an operation by the 1st Army Group on the Khalkhin-Gol River. The briefings and presentations by comrades I. N. Studenikin, I. M. Dmitriyev, Yu. D. Nogayev, A. F. Leonov, N. K. Len'ko, Yu. V. Yanko and Yu. V. Golikov examined in detail not only the course of the fighting, but also the influence of experience gained on the further development of different combat arms in the prewar years, their reoutfitting with the latest models of combat equipment and weaponry, and on a revision of certain provisions of prewar regulations, manuals and views on the nature of troop combat training; and they revealed questions of the use and development of the experience of the Khalkhin-Gol fighting in the Great Patriotic War.

Military-historical conferences are an effective means for increasing the activeness of generals and officers in elaborating military-historical topics. As a rule, the conferences are preceded by a number of lectures on problems which have arisen and which have been resolved by our Armed Forces in the course of numerous operations. Such lectures examine in detail matters of the organization of command and control and coordination, and features of the tactical employment of combat arms and comprehensive support to combat actions in

the most instructive operations; they analyze positive aspects and the mistakes made; and they provide recommendations on using the experience of past battles under present-day conditions. Of course the organization of such a lecture group involves a number of difficulties, above all the need to find additional time reserves. The benefit is without question, however, since as a result there is a significant expansion in the framework of questions later brought up for discussion at the conference.

Experience in conducting lectures in organizing military-historical field trips also merits attention. For example, in order to study the experience of combat actions by the 6th Guards Tank Army in August 1945 trip participants were given the lectures: "Concept of the VVK [Supreme High Command] Headquarters for the Manchurian offensive operation and the decision of the commander of the Transbaikal Front," "Decision by the commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army for the offensive operation" and "Preparation of the troops and staffs for the offensive." This significantly contributed to good quality in achieving the set goals. The organization and conduct of military-historical trips to places of past actions and engagements merits special attention in general inasmuch as the generals and officers' skills of working on the terrain are perfected in their course.

The district regularly organizes military-historical tours for the personnel as well for familiarization with the Motherland's heroic past and propaganda of grand combat traditions. We can give as an example a tour by cadets of the Irkutsk Higher Military Aviation Engineering School imeni 50th Anniversary of the Komsomol to battle sites of the 5th Army and 30th Irkutsk-Pinsk Division in the Civil War. During this tour they gave 180 lectures and briefings in rural clubs and held 462 lessons of courage in schools of general education.

A close friendship links the Transbaikal military personnel with those of the fraternal Mongolian People's Republic. Troops of the Transbaikal Military District honorably performed their international duty by defending the interests of socialist Mongolia together with the Mongolian People's Army. The brotherhood in arms sealed in blood is widely propagandized in the district and serves as a reliable basis for indoctrinating personnel in a spirit of internationalism. Military unit libraries organized book exhibits dedicated to the victory on the Khalkhin-Gol River during the days of celebration of the victory's 40th anniversary and clubs held jubilee evenings with the participation of veterans who participated in the fighting. The experience of conducting joint combat actions and of arranging party-political work was analyzed at military-historical conferences in the staffs of combined units and units. A joint agitation tour of Soviet and Mongolian military personnel was arranged at the initiative of the MNA [Mongolian People's Army] political directorate. Thirty-five Transbaikal soldiers from among Komsomol activists and persons outstanding in combat and political training took part in it. During the agitation tour, which stretched some 2,000 km, eight rallies were held with workers of aymak and somon centers, and wreaths were laid at monuments to Soviet and Mongolian soldiers who died. On returning to their units, participants of the agitation tour shared impressions with colleagues and told about the successes of the MNR [Mongolian People's Republic] in building socialism and about the respect and gratitude which the Mongolian people entertain for the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces.

The military-patriotic propaganda and indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of grand combat traditions and of love for the land in which they serve and which they must be ready to defend with weapons in hand are the most important tasks of military-historical work. The status of military-patriotic propaganda and measures for its improvement are examined regularly at district military council sessions. The activation of military-patriotic indoctrination of the civilian youth and reinforcement of military sponsorship ties also are facilitated by a discussion of these matters at plenums of CPSU obkoms, autonomous republics and oblasts located on the district's territory. This work is especially activated in preparing for and celebrating jubilees of the most important events in our state's life. For example, in 1980 primary attention was given to the preparation and conduct of activities dedicated to the 110th anniversary of Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the defeat of militaristic Japan. In addition to the aforementioned military-historical conferences, the units and subunits have held hundreds of thematic evenings on the topics: "Ways of the fathers are roads of the sons," "The Soviet Army is an army-liberator," "Always on guard" and so on; as well as readers' conferences on the books: "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces], "Malaya Zemlya" [The Novorossiysk Base of Operations] by M. I. Brezhnev, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Memoirs and Reflections] by G. K. Zhukov, "Pobeda" [The Victory] by A. B. Chakovskiy, "Ordena Lenina Zabaykal'skiy" [Order of Lenin Transbaikalia] and others. There were meetings with Great Patriotic War and the partisan movement participants and veterans in the district directorate, military units, establishments and enterprises.

Sources of the Soviet people's victory, exploits by military personnel, partisans and underground personnel, and the labor heroism of people of the Land of Soviets in the war years were widely reflected in visual agitation in garrison officers' clubs, military unit enlisted men's clubs, subunit reading rooms and on the grounds of military posts. A visit by civilian youth to military units, an extensive display of combat relics in rooms of combat glory, and joint competitions in applied sports were arranged.

The laying of wreaths at monuments and obelisks connected with the history of the Great Patriotic War was arranged together with local party and soviet entities on Victory Day.

Military-historical work in the combined units and units is aimed at successful accomplishment of the missions facing district troops. It is conducted in a close tie with officers' operational-tactical training for the purpose of their mastery of more effective techniques and methods for defeating large enemy groupings under various conditions of the initiation and conduct of combat actions.

It should be noted that the instructive experience of the past war, particularly actions by Transbaikalia Front troops to cross the Great Khingan mountain range and the desert-steppe terrain in defeating the Kwantung Army is used widely in troop and command and staff exercises, and above all on mountainous terrain, in penetrating fortified areas and in assault crossings of water obstacles.

Museums, rooms of combat glory, libraries and press entities hold a prominent place in propaganda of the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the CPSU, the Soviet people and the USSR Armed Forces.

During the time of its existence, i.e., from February 1965 up to the present time, the Museum of Troop History of the Order of Lenin Transbaikal Military District has been visited by some 1.5 million persons already. Among them are soldiers and workers, students and pupils, excursionists from various cities of Siberia and the Far East, participants of party and trade union conferences and seminars, and members of various delegations from the Mongolian People's Republic.

The basic forms of the museum's work are thematic and survey excursions, of which 395 were conducted last year alone. Greatest success is enjoyed by excursions on the topics: "Heroic exploits of Transbaikal personnel in the Great Patriotic War," "The Transbaikal Front in the Manchurian offensive operation," "Heroes of the Soviet Union who are natives of Chitinskaya Oblast," "Liberation of the Transbaikal from the Semenov personnel and interventionists," "Exploits of Transbaikal personnel in fighting on the Khalkhin-Gol River" and "Our friend and neighbor, the Mongolian People's Republic."

It has become a firm practice to hold thematic evenings in troop units, educational institutions and city schools of general education. For example, at the evening entitled "Combat colors are witnesses of glory," the personnel of one of the units were present at trooping of the colors of the 262d Demidov-Khingan Red Banner AAA Division, kept in the museum. V. I. Zabelin, a member of the museum council, told eloquently about the campaign record of these famed combined units. Then the colors of the 149th Red Banner Rifle Regiment were carried into the room. To a storm of applause by those present, the floor was given to war veteran Col (Ret) V. M. Vityazev, who fought under these colors on the Khalkhin-Gol River. His story about the courage and heroism of personnel in fighting against Japanese militarists in 1939 and 1945 was received with special warmth. The privates and NCO's who spoke later assured veterans of the 149th Regiment that the heirs of military glory--personnel of the 1980's--would multiply the combat traditions of the Transbaikal personnel with high indicators in combat and political training. The evening concluded with an amateur concert where works with a heroic theme were performed.

Specially created expositions and regularly arranged meetings with war veterans generate great interest in museum visitors. Last year general attention was drawn by expositions devoted to the 90th anniversary of Mar SU V. K. Blyukher's birthday and the centennial of the birth of HSU Lt Gen D. M. Karbyshev, as well as meetings with participants in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad, the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and the assault on Berlin.

The museum also provides assistance in creating expositions for combat glory rooms, which now are present in all district units which participated in fighting for the Motherland. These expositions widely propagandize the campaign record of combined units and units and cover the exploits for which those units were presented with honorary designations and governmental awards, as well as the lives and exploits of countrymen who are Heroes of the Soviet

Union and full wearers of the Order of Glory. The combat glory room of a tank unit in Peschanka enjoys all-union fame. CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, MSU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev served at this post in the prewar years. The room's work already has been covered in detail in the pages of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.¹

There are many units in the Order of Lenin Transbaikalian Military District renowned for fighting for the Soviet Motherland, the combat traditions of which are used to indoctrinate young defenders of the Land of Soviets. All of them have a rich combat history. Commissions have been set up to write the district's history as well as histories of the combined units and units. They include the best trained officers of leading departments, and political officers. Much preparatory work has been performed as a result. Commission members traveled to the USSR Ministry of Defense Archives to collect materials. New histories have been written in all units and combined units and historical logs are kept regularly.

The grand combat traditions of the USSR Armed Forces and of Transbaikalian personnel are covered widely in the pages of the district newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU. Two or three times a week it prints articles under the rubric: "Heroes and Exploits" (about frontlinesmen performing extensive military-patriotic work at the present time), "No One Has Been Forgotten, Nothing Has Been Forgotten" (about those who died the death of the brave during the Civil War, fighting on the KVZhD [Chinese Eastern Railway], at the Khalkhin-Gol and during the Great Patriotic War), "The Heart's Memory" and "Fighting Men Recall Past Days" (stories by direct participants of various historical events). The primary emphasis in these articles is placed on coverage of exploits by military personnel who served in district troops as well as those native to the area.

Articles under the rubric "Eternally in Formation" also appear periodically in the newspaper. These are stories about those who have been placed forever on the rolls of district units.

Among articles of recent years we can note the essays dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Transbaikalian's liberation from the White Guards and interventionists: about S. G. Lazo, V. K. Blyukher, S. S. Vostretsov, A. Ya. Lapin and other Civil War heroes; about the course of fighting for Chita; and about the defeat of Semenov's band in the Transbaikalian and Pepelyayev's band in Yakutiya.

In connection with the semicentennial of the defeat of the White Chinese on the KVZhD, the newspaper told about actions by the Transbaikalian Group of Forces and exploits of Red commanders A. P. Beloborodov, I. I. Fedyuninskiy and G. I. Khetagurov, who were decorated with the orders of Combat Red Banner and who later were prominent military leaders.

Over 30 different articles were dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Japanese invaders at the Khalkhin-Gol River by Soviet and Mongolian troops. They tell of the heroism of tankmen and pilots, artillerymen and infantrymen, and about combat cooperation of soldiers of the Red Army and MNA.

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1981, pp 79-80.

At that same time publication began of essays on Transbaikal military personnel who received a baptism of fire at the Khalkhin-Gol and who were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

The military-historical work among our district's troops takes in a very wide range of issues. Its tasks stem directly from the thesis in the report by CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th party congress that "now it is already the sons and grandsons of Great Patriotic War heroes who are in the ranks of the Motherland's defenders. They did not go through the stern ordeals which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers, but they are true to the heroic traditions of our Army and our people. And each time the interests of national security and defense of peace demands it, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless, courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome any difficulties."²

All military-science and military-historical work in the Order of Lenin Transbaikalian Military District is aimed specifically at instilling these qualities.

2. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 66.

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MILITARY SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Chairman of the VNO (Military Scientific Society) Council, RSU Arm Gen P. Lashchenko: "25th Anniversary of the Military Scientific Society of the TsDSA (Central Soviet Army Club) imeni M. V. Frunze]

[Text] On one February day of 1957 a group of generals, admirals and officers of the reserve and retired assembled at the Central Soviet Army Club imeni M. V. Frunze. These Great Patriotic War participants at that time were enjoying a deserved rest, but it was not a desire to hear a concert or view a new film that took the veterans that day to the TsDSA. Among them were famous military leaders, prominent political workers, prominent scientists and military engineers... They came in response to the call of duty. That day, in conformity with instructions of the Minister of Defense about setting up military scientific societies in the Armed Forces, an organizational meeting was held which founded such a society under the TsDSA.

The veterans hoped that their knowledge and very rich life and combat experience would be put to use in this society and that they would make what contribution they could to the cause of strengthening the beloved Motherland's defenses and military-patriotic indoctrination of workers, especially the youth. And so 25 years ago the Military Scientific Society of the TsDSA imeni M. V. Frunze was founded and is now one of the largest working on a voluntary basis. At the present time it has 645 persons including 94 generals, 18 admirals, 359 colonels and 23 captains 1st rank. Let's give a few more noteworthy data. There are 190 VNO members who are party veterans and who have been in party ranks over 50 years. The Society has 15 RSU's, 6 Heroes of Socialist Labor and 14 laureates of State and Lenin prizes. Over 90 percent of its members have a higher military education and extensive experience in command, scientific research and pedagogic work. The Society has 25 doctors of sciences, 137 candidates of sciences and docents, and over 270 VNO members even now are working successfully in the national economy. Such a high scientific potential results in an opportunity to accomplish major, important tasks at a high ideological-theoretical and practical level.

Eleven sections function in the Society. Their work is carried out along the following directions: military-scientific and scientific research work,

including the study and propaganda of the military-theoretical heritage of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and a generalization of the experience of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars as well as of present-day military theory and practice; literary and publication work (including elaboration of military-literary works and the writing of memoirs and textbooks); the propaganda of military knowledge; and military-patriotic indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and workers, and especially the student youth.

The sections are directed by the VNO council consisting of 58 persons. It is represented by all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. The VNO presidium of seven persons exercises daily direction.

Over the past 25 years members of the VNO of the TsDSA have elaborated over 1,600 topics, among which there were some 350 military-political, 260 military-historical, 180 on the military art of the Ground Forces, 220 on the naval art, 185 military-technical, some 350 logistical and 200 military-topographic subjects.

Let's mention a few of the topics elaborated in most detail: "Questions of military art in the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin"; "Party-political work in operations of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars"; "On the initial period of the Great Patriotic War"; "On strategic direction of the Soviet Army's armed struggle in the Great Patriotic War"; "Local wars and their influence on the development of modern military art" and so on.

The list of such topics could be continued. Many of them were elaborated by creative collectives for which specialists of different sections were brought in. There was a discussion of the projects at military-scientific conferences, which examined, for example, such topics as "Socialism and the struggle for peace," "On the subject and content of Soviet military science" and others. Special military scientific conferences were devoted to the books of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], "Malaya Zemlya" [The Novorossiysk Base of Operations], "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth], "Tselina" [The Virgin Lands] and "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs].

There have been military-historical conferences on the topic: "The Battle of Moscow," "The Battle of Stalingrad," "The Belorussian Offensive Operation" as well as on the Jassy-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other offensive operations. There was a very active military-scientific conference on the topic "The 35th anniversary of victory over fascist Germany." Great interest was generated by readers' conferences on the books of G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, K. K. Rokossovskiy and I. Kh. Bagramyan. The conferences contributed to an improvement in the operational and tactical level of VNO members.

The Military-Scientific Society made no small contribution to publication of military-scientific and military fictional literature. It established ties with Voenizdat, Politizdat, the publishing houses "Mysl'," "Nauka," "Moskovskiy rabochiy," "Znaniye," DOSAAF and others, and with editorial boards of many newspapers and journals.

In the years of the VNO's existence its members have prepared over 600 military-literary works for the press, including 74 monographs, 104 books of memoirs, 13 books on various scientific-theoretical matters, 56 pamphlets on military, military-political and military-technical topics, 121 works of fiction and journalistic works, and over 186 textbooks, training aids and reference works. Many of these works have been recommended for use in military educational institutions.

Readers gave positive responses to the following books: V. A. Semenov's "Razvitiye sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva" [Development of Soviet Operational Art], "Sostoyaniye i osnovnyye napravleniya razvitiya artillerii i raket" [The Status and Basic Directions in the Development of Artillery and Missiles] by P. S. Shumov and V. G. Malikov, V. A. Sychev's "Novoye oruzhiye flota" [New Naval Weapons], Yu. V. Bordzilovskiy's "Voyennyye inzhenernyye voyska na pole boya" [Military Engineer Troops on the Battlefield] and "Put' soldata" [The Soldier's Path], K. N. Galitskiy's "V boyakh za Vostochnuyu prussiyu" [In Fighting for East Prussia] and "Gody surovyykh ispytaniy" [Years of Stern Tests], N. A. Antipenko's "Na glavnom napravlenii" [On the Main Axis], M. I. Ivanov's "Gody voyny v Yaponii" [The War Years in Japan] and "Militarizm Yaponii v poslevoyennyye gody" [Japan's Militarism in the Postwar Years], A. V. Bladgodatov's "Zapiski o kitayskoy revolyutsii i rabota voyennykh sovetnikov v Kitaye" [Notes on the Chinese Revolution and the Work of Military Advisers in China], K. F. Telegin's "Ne ot dadim Moskvu" [We Won't Give Up Moscow], M. I. Burtsev's "Prozreniye" [Enlightenment], "Krasnoznamennyy Baltiyskiy flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941--1945 gg." [The Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945] (by group of authors) and others.

VNO members have put out 76 collections of works and three collections entitled "Voyna, narod, pobeda" [The War, the People and Victory]. The collection "Na zemle, v nebesakh i na more" [On the Land, in the Sky and at Sea] is being prepared for printing. VNO members have published some 2800 articles in the periodical press on political, military-historical and military-theoretical topics.

VNO members give great attention to invention and rationalization work. They have carried out some 200 developments, many of which are inventions and have been adopted both in the Armed Forces and in the national economy.

The Military Scientific Society performs extensive work in the propaganda of military knowledge and the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth. In fulfilling resolutions of party congresses, requirements of the CPSU CC Decree "On a Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," as well as instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, VNO members speak in military units, plants, factories, kolkhozes, establishments and educational institutions. Over 25 years they have given some 47,000 lectures and briefings, have appeared more than 300 times over Central Radio and Television, have conducted over 2,500 lessons of courage in schools and military educational institutions, have traveled to other republics, krays and oblasts 350 times, and have gone on TDY 80 times to give lectures and speeches in foreign countries.

According to far from complete data, some five million persons have heard the lectures, briefings and speeches.

VNO members are reserve or retired generals, admirals and officers, but such qualities of the veterans as diligence, fervor and the desire to be of daily use to the Motherland and strengthen her defensive and economic might have not gone into reserve or retirement. They therefore are even now in the formation of the builders of communism.

The Military Scientific Society of the TsDSA imeni M. V. Frunze celebrated its 25th anniversary in February of this year. At a meeting dedicated to this date VNO members summed up the work for a quarter century and planned new tasks.

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REVIEW OF WAR MEMOIRS OF RIFLE DIVISION COMMANDER

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[Review, published under the heading "Critique and Bibliography," by Col Gen M. Tereshchenko,¹ of book "Idem v nastupleniye" (We're Heading into the Offensive) (War Memoirs) by HSU Maj Gen (Ret) G. S. Zdanovich, Voenizdat, 1980, 182 pages: "We're Heading into the Offensive"]

[Text] That was the title under which the memoirs of HSU Maj Gen (Ret) G. S. Zdanovich, an active participant of the Great Patriotic War, were published. They tell simply, intelligibly and with great warmth about fighting men and commanders of the 203d Rifle Division which he commanded.

Troops of the Southwestern Front withdrew in heavy fighting on the Voronezh and Stalingrad axes in the summer of 1942 under the onslaught of superior enemy forces. To counter the advancing enemy the VGH [Supreme High Command] Headquarters took urgent steps to build defensive lines on approaches to Stalingrad and to concentrate necessary forces and means. Among these forces was the 203d Rifle Division, which set up a defense along the line of the Don River in the vicinity of the stanitsa of Veshenskaya.

Moved urgently to the vicinity of the stanitsa of Yelanskaya on the night of 21/22 August together with other combined units of 63d Army in connection with the situation which had become complicated, the division made an assault crossing of the Don and fought its first battle successfully.

The personnel were inspired by the successful assault crossing of a major water obstacle on improvised means, seizure of a base of operations, and the first prisoners, major trophies and the weapons, ammunition, clothing and rations captured in depots at the farmsteads of Pleshakovskiy, Nizhniy, Krivskiy and Verkhniy Krivskiy. The base of operations was widened to 12 km in frontage and 13 km in depth. Repeated enemy counterattacks were repulsed successfully by the division's subunits and units. Rifle battalions commanded by senior lieutenants N. F. Buzyurgin and Z. A. Aliyev, who demonstrated good combat schooling, steadfastness, determination and proficiency in the fighting, achieved great successes in the fighting to capture, widen and hold the base of operations.

1. During the time described Col Gen M. Tereshchenko was first assistant chief of staff of the 592d Rifle Regiment and subsequently chief of the staff operations section of 203d Rifle Division (January-March 1944).

Disturbed by the situation south of the stanitsa of Yelanskaya, the Hitlerites urgently shifted a portion of their troops and aviation here from near Stalingrad. The primary mission of the 203d Rifle Division's offensive was to divert a portion of the forces of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping from its main axis.

For the division's first combat successes 150 soldiers were decorated with governmental awards (p 17).

The author is not silent about shortcomings and mistakes which took place during the fighting (the lack of continuous reconnaissance, poor organization of coordination among subunits and units, and insufficient organization of the defense in the engineer sense). An analysis of their reasons permitted drawing correct conclusions, which were used later for increasing the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the division's units and subunits. This soon was confirmed by their increased combat proficiency, efficiency and activeness in fighting on distant approaches to Stalingrad. The personnel fought the enemy steadfastly and were gripped with the single passion of winning. For example, machinegunner Pvt Boris Terent'yev repulsed six furious attacks of the Hitlerites but did not abandon the firing position even when he remained alone in the team. After receiving a serious wound in his leg he continued to strike the enemy, who was trying to burst out of the ring of encirclement. The courageous machinegunner became the division's first Hero of the Soviet Union (pp 33-35).

With the victorious conclusion of the Battle of Stalingrad, in which the 203d Rifle Division played a significant role by operating on the outer perimeter of encirclement of Paulus's grouping, it later conducted a successful offensive in the Don steppe, in fighting to liberate Voroshilovgradskaya Oblast, in the battle for the Dnepr, and it participated in the liberation of the Zaporozh'ye, Nikopol', Nikolayev and Odessa, in the assault crossing on the Dnestr and in many other actions.

Each action had its own features. The author skillfully selected and generalized them, showing the new and instructive elements which can be used to some extent even now in the combat and political training of subunits, units and combined units.

The book speaks with great warmth about the privates, NCO's and officers who headed teams, squads, platoons, companies, battalions and regiments. Zdanovich also recalls with a feeling of deep respect the army commanders under whose direction he commanded the division in army operations (1942-1944)--generals V. I. Kuznetsov, D. D. Lelyushenko, A. I. Danilov, I. T. Shlemin and V. D. Tsvetayev. The author notes in the character of each of them those traits which permitted them to direct the troops successfully and build up the blows against the enemy. Above all, this is the ability to focus on the important elements, to estimate the enemy correctly and to make rational use of forces and means for the sake of victory over the foe.

The story of the work of party and Komsomol organizations to indoctrinate division personnel and propagandize Marxism-Leninism under combat conditions

occupies a large space in the book. In noting the role of the personal example of party and Komsomol members in combat, the author shows that it was their valor, readiness to take a risk and ability to lead other soldiers that often decided success of an attack or an action. For example, squad commander party member Sgt M. Begenov skillfully directed subordinates in repulsing enemy attacks and when the offensive began the sergeant was first to burst into an enemy trench and boldly enter into hand-to-hand combat. The enemy was annihilated and the squad occupied the trench, supporting the company's advance.

The commander's personal example in combat was in the arsenal of tested means of influencing people. Here is one of the typical examples. Battalion political officer Capt I. T. Shikunov was making the assault crossing of the Dnepr with an attacking platoon. He was among the first to burst into enemy trenches, leading the fighting men. When the battalion commander was wounded Shikunov assumed command. He inspired the fighting men by his personal example and the battalion held out. Shikunov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the exploit on the Dnepr base of operations.

The author comments with great warmth about division political department chief Col I. F. Bepal'ko. "Everything in this person immediately generated sympathy. . . . He was able to work with people and was able to defend his point of view more calmly, delicately but firmly than anyone else..." (p 19). When a threat appeared to the division OP in one of the difficult actions Col Bepal'ko lay down with a submachinegun in a skirmish line together with the fighting men. Inspired by the political officer, the soldiers held out, but Bepal'ko himself died a hero's death.

Many years have passed, but all who died in battle live in our memory while those who survived in the war and defeated the enemy now work in various sectors of the national economy for the welfare of our people and the Motherland's prosperity.

In the interests of truth one can hardly agree with the author's evaluation of one unsuccessful action conducted by the division on 26 August 1942 (p 5). It is emphasized in the book that "the former division commander and the regimental commanders were at fault" for the unsuccessful outcome of this fight (p 5) and "a great share of the blame also lay with the company and battalion commanders" (p 17).

Yes, that day the division was unsuccessful in combat, but were all commanders from company to regiment at fault? An analysis of this action leads us to the following conclusion.

In reality the unsuccessful outcome of the fight is explained by a number of reasons. First of all, the enemy had an absolute superiority in personnel, tanks and aircraft during the fighting on the base of operations. His aircraft dominated the air and prevented any movements of the division's sub-units.

Secondly, under conditions of the air supremacy it was hardly expedient to regroup two of the division's regiments along the front at the height of the actions in the middle of the day to deliver a planned flank attack. Herein apparently lies their fatal mistake, but this is not a mistake of the company and battalion commanders. In that fierce action they usually fought bravely against the enemy, performing their duties, in the combat formation of their subunits. Many of them fell the death of heroes on the battlefield. With regard to the regimental commanders, they also firmly controlled the subunits and were able not only to consolidate firmly with small forces on the lines they had won, but also hold the important base of operations on the right bank of the Don. It was from here that the decisive historical November offensive later began for the purpose of encircling the enemy at Stalingrad. A ponderable word still has not been said about the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers who dug in on these Don bases of operation or about their role at that difficult time.

Thirdly, enemy reserves already were approaching those lines where the division's units were operating at that time. This unquestionably complicated the situation even more and changed the correlation of forces in the enemy's favor.

On the whole, however, Maj Gen (Ret) Zdanovich's book is meaningful and interesting. It will find a path to the reader's heart and serve well the cause of military-patriotic indoctrination of Soviet citizens.

We division veterans express gratitude to our frontline commander for the great work of creating a chronicle of the grand military deeds of our countrymen and the famed rifle division in which we fought our way for many hundreds of kilometers of the thorny path of war.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON PARTISAN OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 24 Mar 82) pp 86-88

[Review, published under the heading "Critique and Bibliography," by Col (Ret) N. Medvedev of book "Partizanskoye Podmoskov'ye" (Moscow Area Partisans) by V. A. Perezhogin, Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1981, 112 pages, illustrated: "In the Rear of Army Group Center"]

[Text] On the eve of the 40th anniversary of the fascist German forces' defeat at Moscow izdatel'stvo "Moskovskiy Rabochiy" has published the book "Partizanskoye Podmoskov'ye," which reveals the heroic deeds of Soviet partisans in the rear of fascist troops advancing on the Moscow strategic axis.

Many works of fiction, military-historical literature as well as memoirs have been published about Soviet citizens' struggle on occupied RSFSR territory. But there still are few books especially devoted to the contribution of Soviet partisans to the defeat of fascist German troops at Moscow. The author has made an attempt in a comparatively small popular science work to fill in this gap.

The book devotes much attention to demonstrating the Communist Party's leadership role in unfolding the popular struggle in the enemy rear. The author tells in detail about party direction of underground party entities and partisan formations on the territory of Moscow Oblast (pp 12-26) and emphasizes that it was usually the secretaries of oblast and rayon party committees who were at the head of underground committees.

The transition of party and soviet leaders to illegal work in the enemy rear and their personal participation in armed struggle against the invaders gave an enormous boost in morale to the population, reinforced confidence in the immutability of Soviet power, and contributed to an increase in the partisans' morale and fighting spirit (p 18).

The author reveals the courage and heroism of Moscow area partisans in all chapters of the book devoted to various aspects of their combat activities. For example, speaking of the mobilizing and directing role of the commissars of partisan detachments, he shows in concrete examples their high patriotism and selfless performance of military duty. The heroic exploits by commissars of M. A. Gur'vanov's Ugodsko-Zavodskiy partisan detachment, V. P. Mylarshechikov's Volokolamsk detachment and others inspired all personnel of the detachment to

perform heroic deeds. Readers will find here material on Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya, Yelizaveta Chaykina, Aleksandr Chekalin, Il'ya Kuzin, Sergey Sointsev and other partisan heroes.

The author devotes primary attention to showing the partisans' combat actions: reconnaissance, sabotage, ambushes, as well as their joint operations with Soviet Army units.

For example, readers will read with interest the exploits of partisan scouts. As the author correctly emphasizes, by taking in the entire enemy-occupied territory with observation, the partisan reconnaissance provided valuable data not only to the command element of partisan formations, but also to the staffs of Soviet Army units, combined units and formations (p 76).

The book extensively shows the work of sabotage groups on railroads and highways (pp 45-59) as well as the coordination of partisan detachments with Soviet Army units. It tells in detail, for example, about one of the most interesting pages in the history of the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War--the joint combat actions of Smolensk partisans and Gen P. A. Belov's group of forces in the enemy rear in an area south of Vyaz'ma (pp 61-68) in the winter and spring of 1942.

The struggle by all the people in the enemy rear unfolded broadly on all occupied USSR territory. The author has managed, albeit briefly, to tie in events near Moscow with operations by the partisans of Belorussia and the Ukraine who at this time were operating actively on the flank and in the deep rear of Army Group Center (p 59).

Interesting examples about young partisans (A. Shumov, A. Chekalin and others), about the work of underground hospitals, about the participation of German soldiers who went over to the side of the Soviet partisans (Fritz Schmenkel, Gustav Kelman and Jan Kubata) in the antifascist struggle, and about the Hitler command's conduct of punitive operations against partisans operating actively in their rear logically supplement the primary content of this book.

In taking note of the contribution of partisans of the Moscow area in the defeat of Hitler's hordes at Moscow (p 103), the author emphasizes that the Soviet command generalized the experience of combat actions by Soviet partisans during the periods of the summer-fall campaign of 1941 and the winter campaign of 1941-1942, including during the Battle of Moscow. On 30 May 1942 the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was formed under the VGH [Supreme High Command] Headquarters and staff and representations of the partisan movement were formed under front military councils for purposes of unifying direction of the partisan movement. Creation of an orderly system of control opened up new prospects for unfolding the struggle in the enemy rear (p 104).

In writing the book the author made extensive use of archive materials, works already published, as well as memoirs of the participants of partisan struggle. All this of course considerably increased its scientific value.

The book also is not devoid of deficiencies. In our view, the author at times writes in too great detail about the partisan movement on a general plane (pp 5-11, 101, 104, 105) to the detriment of revealing the basic theme. In covering results of combat activities by Soviet partisans during the Great Patriotic War (p 105) he does not give the sources from which corresponding figures and data have been taken.

The author should have taken a stricter approach to the choice of combat episodes. The Northwest Front did not take part in the Battle of Moscow, but the book gives examples of combat actions by Leningrad partisans assigned the mission by the Northwest Front headquarters (pp 56, 57).

The Battle of Moscow ended on 20 April 1942, but a report by the secretary of the Ostashevo underground raykom of the VKP(b) [All Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] is placed on 6 November 1942 (p 19). There was a typographical error in the book here. This event should be dated 6 November 1941.

It is impossible to agree with the author's statement that for the first time in the history of war the general staff of an enemy army was forced to work on planning and organizing punitive expeditions against partisans (pp 104, 105).

As a matter of fact, during the Battle of Moscow the Hitlerite leadership issued a special directive "Basic Propositions on the Struggle Against Partisans," as indicated in the book (p 4), but it was unit staffs, and not the general staff, which handled concrete planning and the conduct of punitive operations against the partisans.

On the whole this book merits a positive evaluation. A wide range of readers greeted it with interest.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON WARTIME EXPLOITS OF TAJIK UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 24 Mar 82) p 88

[Review, published under the heading "Critique and Bibliography," by Senior Scientific Associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences History of the USSR Institute, Doctor of Historical Sciences L. Yusupov of book "Doblestnyye syny Tadzhikistana na frontakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (1941--1945 gg.)" (Valorous Sons of Tajikistan at Great Patriotic War Fronts (1941-1945)) by L. P. Sechkina, Dushanbe, Donish, 1980, 227 pages: "Tajiks in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Speaking of the main hero of the Great Patriotic War, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "This immortal hero is the entire friendly family of nations populating our country and welded by indestructible bonds of brotherhood. Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Lithuanians, Moldavians, Lettish, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Armenians, Turkmen and Estonians--in short, the sons of all nations of the Soviet Union stood up to defend their Motherland. The party's Leninist policy of nationalities withstood the test of war. Fascism did not succeed in driving a wedge between socialist nations. Their fraternal alliance demonstrated its force and vitality and was one of the chief sources of victory over the fascist invaders."¹

Izdatel'stvo "Donish" (Dushanbe) published the book by L. P. Sechkina, the basis of which is this noteworthy conclusion. After generalizing much concrete material the author managed to show the unified international family of nations of the Soviet Union in which Tajiks and Russians, Ukrainians and Uzbeks, and representatives of other nations and nationalities who left for the front from Tajikistan fought shoulder to shoulder. Sechkina persuasively demonstrated the concrete contribution made by every union and autonomous republic, including the Tajik SSR, to the cause of victory over Hitler Germany. Over 250,000 sons and daughters of the republic defended our Motherland's honor and independence at war fronts. Forty-nine of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union and 14,000 were decorated with orders and medals (p 226). Some 60,000 Tajik soldiers did not return from the battlefields (p 3).

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 34.

In tracing the campaign record of combined units and units activated in Tajikistan and vividly revealing the combat exploits of Tajik soldiers, the author leads the reader to the conclusion that "the massive heroism of Soviet citizens at the Patriotic War fronts was contingent on the unshakable unity of the multinational Soviet nation" (p 225). All nations of our Motherland united in the struggle against a common enemy.

On the whole the book merits a positive evaluation but the author should have traced in greater detail the campaign record of soldiers mentioned in it and should have told about the labor activities of some of them in the postwar period.

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PACIFIC FLEET'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY MARKED

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[Article, published under the heading "Military-Historical Dates," by Candidate of Historical Sciences Adm (Ret) S. Zakharov: "50th Anniversary of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet"]

[Text] The direct threat of an attack on our country by imperialist Japan made it necessary to take urgent steps in the early 1930's for reinforcing defenses of Far Eastern borders and for organizational development of the Navy in the Pacific. In April 1932 the party Central Committee and Soviet government made the decision to create the Far East Naval Forces (redesignated the Pacific Fleet on 11 January 1935) in the shortest possible time. M. V. Viktorov was appointed the commander, O. S. Solonnikov the chief of staff, and A. A. Bulyzhkin political directorate chief. The birthday of the Pacific Fleet is considered to be 21 April 1932, when the commander's first order told of his assuming the position and gave a list of the Fleet order of battle.

By late 1935 it had moved into first place among other fleets in the primary indicators of combat and political training. The submariners achieved especially great success. Courageous crews of "Shch" Class submarines commanded by M. S. Klevenskiy, I. M. Zaydulin, N. P. Yegipko, A. V. Buk and A. I. Matveyev made long deployments, bettering the then existing technical norms and calculations for cruising range and length of stay at sea in a submerged and surfaced condition. The Pacific Fleet's growth was facilitated to an enormous extent by the rapid development of productive forces of our entire country, including the Far East. In the period 1936-1938 it received a considerable number of submarines, high-speed minesweepers, sub hunters and auxiliary vessels from the shipbuilding industry. Beginning in 1939 new destroyers and then cruisers built at Soviet yards began to come into the Fleet.

Remarkable cadres of navymen, famed during the Great Patriotic War, developed and were tempered in the Pacific Fleet in the prewar years. Many of them became commanders of ships and forces and CIC's of flotillas and fleets. Among them are Flt Adm SU S. G. Gorshkov, Adm A. G. Golovko and Adm F. S. Otkvabr'skiy.

Pacific Fleet personnel took part in the defeat of Japanese aggressors in the vicinity of Lake Khasan (August 1938). Warships provided units of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army with ammunition, weapons and rations, evacuated the wounded and protected lines of communication. Naval aviation delivered bombing attacks against the enemy. Seventy-four Pacific Fleet personnel were decorated with orders and medals and hundreds received the "Participant of Khasan Fighting" emblem for distinction in fighting at Lake Khasan.

The Pacific Fleet was visited by Politburo Member, Secretary of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] CC A. A. Zhdanov by assignment of the party Central Committee in April 1939. He visited shipyards of the Primor'ye, inspected the ships being constructed, chatted with workers and engineers, visited a number of ships and fleet bases, took a detailed interest in the life and combat training of Pacific Fleet personnel, and put to sea aboard the destroyer "Voykov." Zhdanov gave high praise to the navymen's military proficiency. At a meeting of the Vladivostok party aktiv, with the participation of Army and Navy representatives, Zhdanov assigned concrete tasks for implementing resolutions of the 18th VKP(b) Congress, for the further development of the Far East's productive forces and for reinforcing its defenses.

The brightest page in Fleet history is its participation in the war against imperialist Japan. Interworking with troops of the 1st and 2d Far East fronts, the Pacific Fleet (the CIC was Adm I. S. Yumashev, the author of this article was the military council member, Vice Adm A. S. Frolov was chief of staff and Maj Gen A. A. Murav'yev was political directorate chief) played a very important role in our troops' rapid occupation of South Sakhalin, the Kuriles and ports of North Korea, and aided in the very rapid advance of Soviet troops into the depth of Manchuria. Over 30,000 Pacific Fleet personnel were decorated with orders and medals, 43 were given the title of HSU, and renowned officer V. N. Leonov received a second "Gold Star" medal. Nineteen warships, units and forces were given guards titles, 13 received honorary designations and 16 were decorated with orders.¹

The Pacific Fleet was not only a reliable guardian of the Far East's maritime borders, but also a forge of cadres. Over 147,000 Pacific Fleet personnel took part in the battles at Moscow and Stalingrad, in the heroic defense of Sevastopol' and Leningrad, in fighting for the North Caucasus and Arctic, and at other sectors of fronts. Many submarines and surface combatants were redeployed to active fleets and took an active part in fighting against fascist invaders. Dozens of well trained aircraft crews regularly were sent to the front and they worthily performed their duty to the Motherland.²

By Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 7 May 1965 the Pacific Fleet was awarded the Order of Red Banner for courage and steadfastness displayed by Pacific Fleet navymen in defending the socialist Motherland and to mark the 20th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 8, Voenizdat, 1980, p 58.

2. Ibid.

The Pacific Fleet, like all the country's Armed Forces, underwent fundamental qualitative changes in postwar years as a result of the enormous achievements of socialist industry, science and technology and thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party and Soviet government. It now has become ocean-going, nuclear missile-capable, and outfitted with the most up-to-date nuclear-powered strategic submarines, guided missile surface combatants, and missile-armed aircraft. It has moved from coastal waters and inland seas to the expanses of the ocean. Now the Pacific Fleet personnel practice the majority of their missions on long deployments in various ocean latitudes.

The meeting with CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev during his trip through Siberia and the Far East was an event of enormous importance for the Pacific Fleet personnel.

On 7 April 1978 L. I. Brezhnev accompanied by CPSU CC Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov and CIC of the Navy Flt Adm SU S. G. Gorshkov arrived in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. He put to sea aboard the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin" with his entourage and observed an opposed-forces exercise of naval forces. At the completion of the exercise Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev gave a speech in which he set forth the most important problems of the international situation and the CPSU's foreign policy activity, and missions of Soviet Army and Navy personnel. Brezhnev made an entry in the ship's Book of Honored Guests, which is given in the published photograph [photograph not reproduced]. Brezhnev presented the Pacific Fleet personnel with his book "Malaya Zemlya" [The Novorossiysk Base of Operations] with the author's inscription. This book now is kept in the Fleet museum.

Brezhnev's visit to the Fleet generated high patriotic enthusiasm among the Pacific Fleet personnel and served as a great impetus for development of socialist competition among ship and unit personnel for achieving new goals in military work.

Pacific Fleet personnel greeted the 26th CPSU Congress worthily. They successfully fulfilled pregress pledges. The level of the personnel's combat and political training rose and Fleet might increased. The navymen took the mission for further strengthening of our country's defenses, stemming from resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the report there by CPSU CC General Secretary Brezhnev, as a program for action. The appeal by the crew of the nuclear-powered strategic submarine (commanded by Capt 1st Rank V. Zhuravlev) of the Red Banner Northern Fleet to Navy personnel with a call to unfold socialist competition under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" and mark the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation with a further increase in combat readiness and with improvement in military proficiency elicited a broad response in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet (the CIC is Adm V. V. Sidorov and the Member of Military Council and Chief of Political Directorate is Vice Adm N. P. D'yakonovskiy).

The crews of the large ASW ship "Petropavlovsk" (commanded by Capt 2d Rank A. S. Kuz'min, a delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress) and "Tashkent" (commanded by Capt 2d Rank N. I. Yelovskiy), the small guided missile combatant "Amurskiy

Komsomolets" (commanded by Capt-Lt A. S. Volov) and many other ships, units and subunits achieved great success in combat and political training and in socialist competition.

In celebrating the semicentennial of their native Fleet, the Pacific Fleet navymen, being true to its revolutionary and combat traditions, are striving for new heights of military proficiency. They are standing reliably on guard over the interests of the socialist homeland and standing a vigilant watch on the maritime borders of the Soviet Far East.

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